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Evaluating Boards and Directors 
 
Abstract 
The challenge for boards is to prevent crises in the organisations they govern. 
Performance evaluation is a key means by which boards can recognise and correct 
corporate governance problems and add real value to their organisations.  Our paper 
provides a practical introduction to board and director evaluations. We discuss the 
reasons for governance failures and how board evaluations can help prevent them 
from occurring.  We then review the performance pressures facing boards and the 
benefits of board evaluations in meeting these pressures.  Finally, we introduce our 
framework for a successful board and/or individual director evaluation, whatever the 
company type.  In this framework, we suggest there are seven key questions to 
consider when planning a board evaluation and discuss each of these seven decision 
areas. 
Keywords:  Boards of directors; Performance evaluation; Corporate governance 
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Evaluating Boards and Directors* 
Behavioral psychologists and organizational learning experts agree that 
people and organizations cannot learn without feedback. No matter how 
good a board is, it’s bound to get better if it’s reviewed intelligently 
(Sonnenfeld, 2002: 113). 
Corporate governance issues continue to receive a high profile in the business press. 
Recent problems at Disney and Fannie Mae in the United States, and the massive 
losses at Marconi plc in the United Kingdom, add to the litany of governance failures 
and scandals that have characterised big business in the 21st century.  These failures 
underscore the fact that boards must be concerned with more than organisational and 
management performance, they also need to review their own performance.  Board 
evaluation is a significant way for boards to show they are serious about their 
performance, and as Sonnenfeld astutely observes in the above quotation, even good 
boards can benefit from a properly conducted evaluation.  Unfortunately, while 
“[m]ost people are interested in doing an evaluation...they’re quite ignorant about how 
to do it” (Bob Garratt qtd in Bingham, 2003).  This paper provides a practical 
introduction to board and director evaluations. 
To begin, we discuss reasons behind governance failures and how board evaluations 
can help prevent them.  We then highlight the significant performance pressures 
boards now face and the benefits of board evaluation in helping meet these pressures.  
In the third section of the paper, we introduce our framework for a successful board 
and/or individual director evaluation.  In this framework, we suggest there are seven 
key questions to consider when planning a board evaluation and discuss each of the 
                                                 
* This paper was presented at the 7th International Conference on Corporate Governance and Board 
Leadership, 11-13 October 2004 at the Centre for Board Effectiveness, Henley Management College. 
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seven decision areas for the board evaluation process.  Whether a company is listed on 
the stock exchange, a small family company or a not-for-profit organisation, the 
framework can be used to develop an evaluation process appropriate to the 
organisation.   
Governance failures 
Governance failures may result in either a significant reduction in, or total destruction 
of, shareholder wealth. There are also a broader set of economic and social 
ramifications that come with the closure of businesses and loss of jobs and retirement 
benefits. Given the widespread implications of corporate failure, it is important to 
understand how boards contribute to this failure.  We provide four categories for these 
failures: strategic, control, ethical and interpersonal relationship.  Often these failures 
are interrelated. For example, at Enron, the board failed in the areas of strategy, 
control and, arguably, ethics, while at Hollinger International there were failures in 
the areas of control and ethics.  The following examples illustrate the four categories 
of governance failure: 
1. Strategic failure: with full board approval, the managing director of UK 
corporation Marconi plc disposed of the company’s engineering, electrical and 
defence products businesses despite these being the foundation of the 
company’s success.  The company, again with board approval, launched into 
an ill-considered and ill-timed strategy aimed at turning Marconi into a cutting 
edge technology firm (Court, 2003);  
2. Control failure: the board of Barings plc oversaw an inadequate risk 
management system that resulted in losses estimated to be in the vicinity of 
₤927 million.  As a result, rogue trader Nick Leeson brought down the 
merchant bank (Hogan, 1997);  
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3. Ethical failure:  in an attempt to remove potential asbestos liabilities from the 
company’s books, Australian building products company James Hardie 
Industries restructured its business through the incorporation of a new parent 
company in the Netherlands. During the process it transferred responsibility 
for asbestos compensation to a medical foundation that was found to be under-
funded (Buffini, 2004). The company is still battling the reputation damage of 
the board’s decision; and  
4. Interpersonal relationship failure:  the board of Walt Disney Co. has earned the 
ire of institutional investors for its lack of an independent board.  Boardroom 
battles between then chairman and CEO Michael Eisner and dissident board 
members Roy Disney and Stanley Gold, who subsequently resigned to lead a 
campaign to oust Eisner, have become the stuff of legend (CBSNEWS.com, 
2003).  
We could continue this litany of examples of corporate failure and even debate the 
categorisation of each failure.  But it is not our intention to document corporate 
failures, rather it is to assist boards improve themselves, so as to minimise failure 
from strategic ineptitude, lack of controls, dishonesty or poor dynamics.   
Board evaluations provide a process for boards to identify sources of failure.  They 
allow boards to diagnose areas of concern before they reach crisis point.  For 
example, a board evaluation can ask the directors how well the board is performing 
the strategy role and whether they feel comfortable that they are adding value in the 
strategy generation process.  Similar questions can be asked about the monitoring and 
control role of the board.  A well-designed evaluation, covering both board-as-a-
whole and individual director evaluation, is likely to raise the issue of ethical concerns 
among some directors in relation to others or management.  The same comments can 
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be made for interpersonal relationship failure.  A well-designed board evaluation can 
serve to highlight potential issues and promote discussion and resolution before 
concerns become major crises.  Board evaluations are not a universal panacea for all 
board ills.  However, used correctly and regularly, they may play a major role in 
averting a governance failure. 
The pressure to perform 
Averting corporate failure is not the only pressure faced by boards; increasing 
demands for organisational performance are also increasing performance pressures on 
boards.  There are number of reasons for this.  First, as boards are held increasingly 
accountable for corporate performance, they become increasingly more proactive in 
the leadership of the companies they govern.  Effective leadership is seen as critical to 
establishing the tone of a corporation (i.e. its culture and values), developing a 
strategic direction, guiding change and formulating corporate objectives, and ensuring 
effective implementation takes place.  Holding boards accountable in these areas 
represents a fundamental shift in organisational thinking.  For close on 100 years, the 
chief executive, supported by his or her management team, was largely seen as totally 
responsible for these areas.  Today, underpinned by theoretical developments in 
agency theory (e.g., Hendry, 2002), and fuelled by tales of corporate excesses such as 
Hollinger International (Aylmer, 2004) and Tyco (Bianco, Symonds, Byrnes and 
Polek, 2002), shareholders, legislators and society at large are increasingly demanding 
that boards demonstrate leadership and control.  After all, they are the peak body in 
organisations.  In short, the role of the board has changed from management support 
to organisational leadership.  This represents a paradigm shift in management 
thinking, the full implications of which are just dawning upon companies and 
commentators alike (Pound, 1995). 
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Second, and related to the first reason, there has been a dramatic rise in shareholder 
activism over the past two decades.  The main reason for this increased activism is the 
increase in power of large institutional investors, who are becoming far more 
demanding of boards.  This trend is seen internationally with large pension funds in 
the US (such as CalPERS) being vocal advocates for governance reform.  Thus, 
despite mixed findings on the empirical links between corporate governance and firm 
performance (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson 
and Ellstrand, 1999; Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2000), there is a 
discernable and growing belief in the investment community that good governance 
will enhance corporate outcomes.  Institutional investors perceive that the board can 
directly enhance shareholder value by intervening in the case of corporate crises, 
providing strategic guidance and selecting and monitoring the CEO (Conger, Lawler 
and Finegold, 2001).  As a result, more than 80% of European and US institutional 
investors say they will pay more for companies with good governance (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2001). The onus on boards to improve performance is further 
strengthened by the ability of shareholders and investors to assess the corporate 
governance practices of major corporations through ratings systems such as those 
developed by Standard & Poor’s (2003) and the Corporate Library (2004), which rate 
board effectiveness using factors such as board composition, director tenure and CEO 
compensation. 
In addition to leadership responsibilities and shareholder activism, there is an 
increasing media and community scrutiny of all aspects of corporate life.  Names such 
as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco International in the US, along with Marconi and 
Barings in the UK and HIH Insurance in Australia, have come to symbolise a 
breakdown in corporate ethics and boards are squarely in the firing line.  Society at 
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large is beginning to lay the blame for poor corporate decision making (such as at 
Marconi) and systems failures (such as Baring’s risk management controls) directly at 
the feet of the board.  It appears this scrutiny will continue and only serves to intensify 
community expectations that boards need to be brought to account for the 
performance of the companies they govern.  
For these reasons boards are turning to board evaluation as a major tool to assist them 
in improving their performance.  This global trend sees specific board evaluation 
recommendations forming a key component of nearly every major corporate 
governance review or report.  For example, the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2003) in Australia, Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture 
(Saucier, 2001) in Canada, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Combined 
Code) (Financial Reporting Council, 2003) in the U.K., and the Principles of 
Corporate Governance (A White Paper from the Business Roundtable, May 2002) 
(Business Roundtable, 2002) in the U.S., all make specific recommendations for the 
regular review of board performance.   
The benefits of an evaluation to a board are numerous.  If conducted properly, board 
evaluations can contribute significantly to performance improvements on three levels 
– the organisational, board and individual director level.  Boards who commit to a 
regular evaluation process find benefits across these levels in terms of improved 
leadership, greater clarity of roles and responsibilities, improved teamwork, greater 
accountability, better decision making, improved communication and more efficient 
board operations.  Table 1 summarises the potential benefits of board evaluation to the 
organisation, the board as a whole and to individual directors.  It must be stressed, 
however, that these benefits can only arise from a properly executed board evaluation.  
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Board and director evaluations, if incorrectly executed, can lead to distrust among 
board members and between the board and management. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The board evaluation framework 
Following is a framework for conducting positive board and director evaluations.  
Although boards differ in the severity of their performance problems, the competitive 
environment in which they work and the range of performance issues they face, there 
are a number of key decisions that are relevant to all boards implementing an 
evaluation process.  Our framework for a successful board or individual director 
evaluation relies on the board reaching agreement on the answers to the seven key 
questions illustrated in Figure 1 (Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005).  While the 
seven questions must be asked for all board evaluations, the combined answers can be 
quite different.  As a result, while the questions are common to each, board 
evaluations can range markedly in their scope, complexity and cost.  While we 
describe our framework as a sequential series of events, in practice most boards will 
not follow such a linear process.  Some of these decision areas will be reached 
simultaneously, for example, “who will be evaluated” may be decided at the same 
time as “who will conduct the evaluation”.  Similarly, external issues may dominate 
the approach (e.g., scarce resources may dictate an internal review).  However, at 
some point, each of these questions will need to be answered.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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What are our objectives? 
The first stage of the board evaluation process is to establish what the board hopes to 
achieve.  Clearly identified objectives enable the board to set specific goals for the 
evaluation and make decisions about the scope of the review.  Such issues as the 
complexity of the performance problem, the size of the board, the stage of 
organisational life cycle and significant developments in the firm’s competitive 
environment will determine the issues the board wishes to evaluate.  Similarly, the 
scope of the review – how many people will be involved, how much time and money 
to allocate – will be determined by the severity of the problems facing the board and 
the availability of sufficient resources (human, financial and time) to carry out an 
evaluation.   
The first decision for most boards to consider is the overriding motivation for the 
evaluation process.  Generally, the answer to this question will fall into one of the 
following two categories: (1) corporate leadership (for example, “We want to clearly 
demonstrate our commitment to performance management”, “We believe reviewing 
our performance is essential to good governance”, “We want to provide directors with 
guidance for their learning and growth”) or (2) problem resolution (for example, “We 
are not sure if we are carrying out good governance”, “Our governance (or some 
specific aspect) is ineffective and/or inefficient”, “There are problems in the dynamics 
in the boardroom”, “We do not seem to have the appropriate skills, competencies or 
motivation on the board”). 
Many boards find that establishing the specific objectives for the review is best 
delegated to a small group (such as the governance committee or nomination 
committee if you have one) or an individual (such as the chairperson or lead 
independent director).  In this case, the first step is for the board to request the group 
 11
or person to document the specific objectives for the process.  At this stage you may 
also wish to consider consulting with an external adviser to overcome any board 
“blind spots” or biases.  The second approach involves the board as a whole 
discussing and agreeing the objectives of the board evaluation.  Generally an 
individual, usually the chairperson or chair of the governance or nomination 
committee, is delegated the task of leading the process. 
With clear objectives, it is relatively easy to decide whose performance will be 
evaluated, who the most appropriate people are to assess performance and the person 
or group best suited to conducting an evaluation.   
Who will be evaluated? 
With the objectives for the evaluation set, the board needs to decide whose 
performance will be reviewed to meet them.  Comprehensive governance evaluations 
can entail reviewing the performance of a wide range of individuals and groups, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.  Boards need to consider three groups: the board as whole 
(including board committees), individual directors (including the roles of chairperson 
and/or lead independent director), and key governance personnel (generally the CEO 
and corporate/company secretary).  Pragmatic considerations such as cost or time 
constraints, however, often preclude such a wide-ranging review.  Alternatively, a 
board may have a very specific objective for the review process that does not require 
the review of all individuals and groups identified in Figure 2.  In both cases, an 
effective evaluation requires the board to select the most appropriate individuals or 
groups to review based on its objectives.  To make this decision, we recommend a 
four-stage process that gradually filters a comprehensive list of possible review 
participants to a pragmatic selection of review subjects. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first stage in the process involves identifying the roles that clearly impact on the 
board’s review objectives and compiling a comprehensive list of individuals or groups 
that affect this objective.  For instance, a review designed to improve the flow of 
information to the board will have a long list of possible candidates for the review.  
The CEO is an obvious candidate, as he or she will be responsible for developing and 
delivering the bulk of board papers and information.  The board will also need to 
consider its own role in specifying its information requirements to the individuals and 
groups responsible for meeting those requirements.  The board also needs to consider 
the role of other personnel such as the corporate/company secretary. 
The second stage involves assessing the potential benefit(s) of including each 
candidate (group or individual) in the review.  Documenting these benefits ensures the 
board will have a common understanding of the relative merits of reviewing each 
candidate when deciding who to include.  Categorising the specific advantages of 
each candidate as critical, useful, or ancillary will assist in your decision making.  For 
the third stage, it is necessary to estimate the time and cost implications of evaluating 
the performance of the candidates in question.   
The final stage in deciding who to evaluate involves balancing the benefits and costs 
of reviewing each of the candidates.  While it is not possible to provide universal, 
prescriptive guidance, the principle is to ensure that all candidates with a major 
impact on the desired objective are reviewed.  The relative importance of each 
candidate will need to be considered in light of the importance of the review 
objective, the relative importance of potential candidates, and the relevant cost 
implications. 
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The most common issue in deciding who to evaluate is whether to concentrate on 
board-as-a-whole or individual director assessment. Regular evaluation of the board 
as a whole can be seen as a process that ensures directors develop a shared 
understanding of their governance role and responsibilities.  Although board-as-a-
whole evaluation is excellent as a familiarisation tool for inexperienced boards, one 
disadvantage is that group evaluation may give only limited insight into performance 
problems.  Consequently, some boards choose to progress to the evaluation of board 
committees, individual directors and the chairperson to gain greater insight into how 
their board is functioning.   
Individual evaluation, in particular, provides the board with an opportunity to probe 
particular issues in depth.  To evaluate individual directors, either self- or peer-
evaluation techniques can be used.  The aim of self evaluation is to encourage 
directors to reflect on their contributions to board activities and have them identify 
their personal strengths and weaknesses.  However, while useful for personal 
reflection and development, self assessment is inappropriate when the board wants an 
objective view of the individual’s performance.  An objective view is best gained 
through peer evaluation, whereby directors identify each other’s individual strengths 
and weaknesses.  By having members of the board evaluate each other, it is possible 
to gain a more rounded picture of the strengths and weaknesses of each director and 
their contribution to the effectiveness of the board.  It can also be used to identify 
skills gaps on the board.  Peer assessment is also more likely to reveal why the board 
is experiencing team performance or ethical dilemmas.   
There is the potential, however, to create serious conflict within the board if 
individual performance evaluation is introduced when some directors are opposed to 
the process.  Board members are entitled to hold differing views on the benefits of 
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individual director evaluation, but consensus must be reached before introducing the 
process.  If directors are willing to at least trial this approach, research evidence 
suggests that many directors find individual director evaluation an extremely 
beneficial process (Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001: 112). 
What will be evaluated? 
Having established the objectives of the evaluation and the people/groups that will be 
evaluated to achieve those objectives, the next stage involves the evaluation becoming 
specific.  It is now necessary to elaborate these objectives into a number of specific 
topics to ensure that the evaluation (1) clarifies any potential problems, (2) identifies 
the root cause(s) of these problems, and (3) tests the practicality of specific 
governance solutions, wherever possible.  This is necessary whether the board is 
seeking general or specific performance improvements and will suit boards seeking to 
improve areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and 
motivation, or even boardroom relationships. 
When an organisation is facing a significant governance issue or a board is seeking to 
improve its performance, there is rarely a single issue that requires review.  The vast 
majority of governance concerns are, in fact, the result of the interplay between 
individual skills, experience and motivations; the relationships between the board and 
management; and the effectiveness of supporting governance policies, procedures and 
processes (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  Consequently, while there may be a single 
objective for a board review, it is imperative for the evaluation process to examine a 
wide range of potential causes or influences on this objective.   
We suggest that boards consider their specific objectives in light of a best practice 
corporate governance framework. The framework acts as a “lens” through which to 
view the objectives and allows the board to develop a comprehensive list of potential 
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areas for investigation.  Of course, a comprehensive list of areas for investigation will 
need to be balanced with the scope of the evaluation and the resources available for 
the project.  This stage requires the person leading the evaluation to take a realistic 
assessment of the resources available, a key component of which is the time 
availability of directors and other key governance personnel, such as the CEO and 
corporate/company secretary. 
There are a number of frameworks against which boards can assess their performance.  
Specific examples of governance frameworks that boards can use to refine their 
evaluation objectives include John Carver’s (1997b) Policy Governance model, the 
UK’s Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2003), the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD Principles) (OECD, 2004), the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s (2003) Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations and Kiel and 
Nicholson’s (2003) Corporate Governance Charter framework.  It is worth reviewing 
each in turn. 
John Carver (1997b) recommends frequent board self-assessment in his Policy 
Governance model.  This is done by comparing the board’s performance to the 
policies it has developed.  Under Carver’s model, the board is responsible for the job 
of governing, not managing the organisation.   In order to carry out its leadership role, 
the board produces four categories of policies:  
1. Ends: the policies which specify organisational outcomes for the recipients 
and costs of the intended outcomes;  
2. Executive limitations: the policies that limit executive authority;  
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3. Governance process: the policies that define how the board operates, and 
expectations of the board as a whole, individual directors, executives, and 
committees; and  
4. Board-management relationship: policies on the board’s delegation of 
power and monitoring of its use by the CEO.   
The aim of the Combined Code is to enhance board effectiveness and to improve 
investor confidence by raising standards of corporate governance in the U.K.  The 
Combined Code’s main and supporting principles provide a framework through which 
a board could develop a set of topics or questions for board evaluation.  For example, 
Section 1A.3 (Board balance and independence) could form the core criterion for the 
evaluation of a board on the question of whether it has the proper structure (which 
includes the skills and experience that should be represented on the board) and size to 
adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties.  This section could also be used to 
clarify what those responsibilities and duties entail.  The Combined Code also 
provides specific advice on board evaluations (Financial Reporting Council, 2003).  It 
suggests boards should be asked to consider “How well has the board performed 
against any performance objectives that have been set?” and “What has been the 
board’s contribution to the testing and development of strategy?” (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2003: 77).  Similarly, the OECD Principles outline how to implement a 
corporate governance framework and as such are a suitable model around which to 
develop evaluation criteria.   
In Australia, the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations contains 10 principles of good governance which are voluntary; 
however, ASX-listed companies that do not follow them are expected to explain why 
they do not. Corporate governance statements in the annual reports of companies 
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listed on the ASX indicate that these principles are being given close consideration.  
The principles and best practice recommendations developed by the Council provide 
another example of a framework through which a board could develop a set of topics 
or questions for board evaluation.  For example, the ASX principles encourage 
organisations to structure their boards to add value to the company (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003, 19).  This could form the core criterion for the evaluation 
of a board on the question of whether it has the proper structure (which includes the 
skills and experience that should be represented on the board) and size to adequately 
discharge its responsibilities and duties, and to clarify what those responsibilities and 
duties entail. 
The final example, Kiel and Nicholson’s Corporate Governance Charter framework, 
illustrated in Figure 3, is conceptualised as a wheel divided into four quadrants 
representing the essential elements of corporate governance.  The first quadrant 
“Defining governance roles” helps boards to define their roles and responsibilities, the 
second, “Improving board processes”, encourages board members to consider the 
effectiveness of their meeting procedures, agendas, board papers and minutes as well 
as the board calendar of events and ensuring efficient processes for board committees.  
The third describes “Key board functions” and the final quadrant, “Continuing 
improvement”, deals with the processes and procedures necessary for ensuring 
continuing improvement and corporate renewal. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The following example highlights how a board can use a framework to address their 
particular evaluation objectives.  Boards often set an objective of identifying any 
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skills gaps on the board.  Generally, this topic arises when there have been major 
changes in the strategy or competitive environment of an organisation and the board 
sees a need to review its skill set.  Choosing what to evaluate in these circumstances 
will depend on such issues as board size and structure, as well as how the board 
executes its key functions (e.g., strategy formulation, service, monitoring, compliance 
and risk management).  Only by reflecting on these topics can a board understand 
what skills it needs. 
When the evaluation objective is to identify skills gaps, the board may also need to 
consider how it will resolve any gaps.  Does the board adequately promote director 
development?  Is there a director development budget?  Or would it be more 
appropriate to appoint someone with the appropriate skills to the board?  If 
recruitment is an option, does the board have in place selection and induction 
procedures that will enable the board to recruit a new board member with suitable 
skills?  Table 2 provides a selection of questions developed from the Corporate 
Governance Charter model to be used in evaluating the board as a whole. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Deciding what to evaluate is one of the most difficult and yet critical components of 
the evaluation process.  The evaluator faces a delicate balancing act between ensuring 
the questioning is extensive enough to identify the root cause(s) of the issue, yet 
manageable enough to satisfy the scope and resource constraints of the review.   
Who will be asked? 
In our experience, the vast majority of board and director evaluations concentrate 
exclusively on the board (and perhaps the CEO) as the sole sources of information for 
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the evaluation process. As Figure 4 illustrates, this discounts numerous potentially 
rich sources of feedback on the performance of the governance system.  As the 
diagram highlights, participants in the evaluation can be drawn from within or from 
outside the company. Internally, board members, the CEO, senior managers and, in 
some cases, other management personnel and employees may have the necessary 
information to provide feedback on elements of a company’s governance system.  
Externally, owners/members and even financial markets can provide valuable data for 
the review.  Similarly, in some situations, government departments, major customers 
and suppliers may have close links with the board and be in a position to provide 
useful information on its performance. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In each board evaluation, the facilitator will need to decide the appropriateness of 
each potential participant’s knowledge to the particular performance issues being 
evaluated.  Generally, boards consult internal sources first.  One way of delineating 
between internal and external participants is to revisit the evaluation objectives and 
clarify whether the focus of the evaluation is on the skills, processes and relationships 
of the board or on the board’s effectiveness in carrying out its key roles.  For example, 
investigating the effectiveness of intra-board relationships is likely to be an 
exclusively internal process, where directors give their impressions of the 
performance of the board as a whole, their personal performance and possibly that of 
their peers.  In this situation, the board members themselves are the most qualified to 
comment on how they feel they work together as a team.  However, if an objective of 
the board is to improve stakeholder relationships, this will best be achieved by 
 20
gathering information from the stakeholders themselves.  Depending on the nature of 
the business, these may be owners, financial analysts, customers or suppliers critical 
to the organisation’s success.   
While these examples of intra-board relations and stakeholder relations represent 
clear-cut instances of the value of internal or external data sources, the board’s 
performance is often best evaluated by a combination of internal and external sources.  
Table 3 describes potential benefits and drawbacks of asking the various participants. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
After examining all potential sources of information along with their relative 
advantages and disadvantages, the facilitator must decide which sources to include in 
the review. This requires an understanding of three issues:  
1. in light of the specific questions identified in the previous step, who has the 
knowledge needed to make a valid and reliable assessment;  
2. what is the level of board experience with, and openness to, the evaluation 
process and what is the impact on who should be asked; and  
3. what resources are available to collect the information from the required 
sources. 
What techniques will be used? 
Depending on the degree of formality, the objectives of the evaluation, and the 
resources available, boards may choose between a range of qualitative and 
quantitative techniques.  Quantitative data are in the form of numbers.  They can be 
used to answer questions of how much or how many.  Qualitative data are not in the 
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form of numbers and will be required for any other type of research question.  Put 
simply, a question of “how much” should employ quantitative research methods, 
whereas questions of “what”, “how”, “why”, “when” and “where” should employ 
qualitative research methods.  Figure 5 provides an overview of the major qualitative 
and quantitative techniques used in board evaluations.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Most boards undertake evaluations without a clear view of the issues before them.  
When the evaluation’s objectives are to identify the key governance problems, screen 
alternative solutions and/or uncover new approaches, qualitative research comes to the 
fore.  Qualitative data does have several drawbacks, however.  The major drawback is 
that interpreting the results requires judgment on the part of the person undertaking 
the review and analysis.  Consequently, conclusions can be subject to considerable 
interpreter bias, even (or particularly) where the person conducting the review is a 
board or company member.  This is best addressed by using experienced researchers 
for the task and having several participants review the conclusions for bias.  Bias can 
also be mitigated by using both quantitative and qualitative techniques (e.g., using a 
survey in conjunction with interviews). 
While there are many different techniques for collecting qualitative data (e.g., 
projective techniques, word associations and role playing to name just a few), the 
three main methods used in governance evaluations are interviews, board observation 
and document analysis.  
The interview is the main qualitative data collection tool because it provides a unique 
opportunity to collect complex and rich data.  It is an excellent way of assessing 
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directors’ perceptions, meaning and constructions of reality by asking for information 
in a way that allows them to express themselves in their own terms.  Interviews may 
be conducted individually or in a group situation.  While interviews are essentially 
about asking questions and receiving answers, the key to uncovering rich information 
is a professional, well-designed interview process.   
By far the most common form of qualitative technique is the individual in-depth 
interview.  The key advantage of the individual interview is that it provides the 
conditions most likely to encourage candid disclosure of sensitive issues, particularly 
where confidentiality is assured. The confidentiality of the situation often encourages 
directors to disclose information that they may feel uncomfortable discussing in a 
group situation.  Thus, individual interviews can be a useful technique for certain 
subjects such as individual director evaluation.  The interview technique is 
particularly suitable for boards wanting to explore one or two major issues in some 
depth.  In-depth interviews are potentially a much richer source of information than 
quantitative data because the range of any discussion is open-ended.  They also prove 
useful when discussing “soft” issues, personal concerns and points of view that are 
not readily disclosed in a written questionnaire (Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001).   
In a group situation (often called a focus group), the interviewer works with several 
people simultaneously rather than individually.  The key difference for the interviewer 
is that he or she takes on the role of a moderator or facilitator, rather than that of an 
interviewer.  Rather than the question and answer pattern of the traditional interview, 
the interviewer uses group dynamics to stimulate discussion of the questions and 
topics of interest (Punch, 1998).  The key benefits of group-based interviews are that 
they are less resource intensive and can stimulate the participants to produce data and 
insights that would not be found without the group interaction.  Conversely, these 
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benefits need to be balanced with possible problems of group culture and dynamics 
that may inhibit candid disclosure.  It is also more difficult for the interviewer to 
establish rapport in a group setting.  We would not normally recommend employing 
group interviews where there are potentially sensitive issues under review. 
Another useful qualitative technique to consider is observation, particularly 
observation of a board meeting.  This technique involves the researcher observing the 
participants in their natural environment – the boardroom.  The researcher neither 
stimulates nor manipulates the participants (i.e. no questions are asked, etc.), but 
rather takes note of the participants’ behaviours, activities and points of interest to the 
research question.  
Observation has a number of advantages as a data collection technique.  Since the data 
is collected as events occur and is a record of what actually occurred, rather than what 
a director thought occurred, it is free from respondent bias, but is still subject to 
observer bias.  It is also easier to identify environmental influences (such as seating 
arrangements in the boardroom) on behaviours and can also be an effective way of 
seeing all board members in action at the one time.  Our experience is that observation 
can be especially useful when the evaluation objectives relate to issues of boardroom 
dynamics or relationships between individuals.  The observer can notice how board 
members relate to each other, if one or two people dominate discussions, whether the 
chairperson demonstrates a strong leadership role, if there is tension between board 
members, how the agenda works in practice and so on.  This information is valuable 
when used in conjunction with information gained from the directors themselves. 
Documents, both contemporary and historical, can be a rich source of information in 
the governance evaluation process.  While it is possible to categorise and/or directly 
code governance documentation, we recommend document analysis as a method of 
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triangulation for use in conjunction with other data collection techniques.  Reviewing 
key documents such as board papers, board minutes, policy manuals and governance 
charters, provides valuable insight into a governance system and a context in which to 
view the results of other data collection techniques (Punch, 1998).  A key benefit of 
document analysis is the questions it raises.  It can be as basic as why a particular 
document does not exist?  What level of detail is included?  What is recorded?  What 
is omitted?  What is the writer taking for granted?  Another benefit is that a review 
and categorisation of documents can assist an experienced facilitator to benchmark 
differences between the board’s documentation and that of other “best practice” 
boards.   
While quantitative data lack the richness of qualitative data, they have the key 
advantage of being specific and measurable.  This enables the evaluation to count, 
compare and contrast individual responses both over time and between individuals.  
Surveys are by far the most common form of quantitative technique used in 
governance evaluations and can be an important information-gathering tool.  It is vital 
to understand, however, that surveys are attitudinal instruments.  Surveys measure 
individuals’ subjective assessments of particular topics and are subject to responder 
bias.  The responses are no more or less valid than qualitative research.  
As with qualitative techniques, surveys can be used as the sole source of information 
for the evaluation, or as one of several data gathering techniques.  If the survey is the 
only method employed to gather data, it will necessarily be more extensive than if it is 
used in conjunction with other techniques.  If it is being used as a component of a 
governance evaluation, the facilitator will have a key decision to make about the 
timing of the survey.  Will the survey draw on the results of interviews (i.e. will the 
questions in the survey be based on what directors identified as key issues) to 
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quantitatively assess what has been identified qualitatively, or will the survey be 
administered as a stand-alone tool?  The answer to this question will depend on the 
objectives of the evaluation and the context of the review.  Often, pragmatic issues 
such as resources or time constraints dictate the response. 
In order to conduct a survey-based board evaluation we suggest following a seven-
step process:   
1. Specifying the objectives of the survey, in light of the evaluation’s overall 
objectives.   
2. Deciding the composition of the survey sample, that is, who will be asked to 
complete the survey?  Is it intended just for board members, or will others, 
such as the senior management team and the CEO, or external stakeholders be 
involved?   
3. Determining how the survey will be administered.  A common way to 
administer the survey is face-to-face, in a situation where the survey is just one 
part of evaluating the board’s performance.  Survey data can also be collected 
by phone, fax or email, or via the internet, which means that directors can 
complete them at a time and place suitable for them.   
4. Designing the questionnaire.  Excellent surveys support the purpose of the 
evaluation – the topics chosen are relevant to the evaluation requirements, the 
questions are worded in such a way as to gain the maximum relevant 
information and to avoid bias, and the measurement technique chosen is most 
appropriate for the information being sought (Kraut, 1996).   
5. Administering the questionnaire.  This involves the fieldwork necessary to 
undertake the board survey, including advising participants of the time and 
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place for the meeting (if a group survey is being conducted), scheduling 
appointments (for individual surveys), or sending the questions by mail, fax or 
email (as an attachment).   
6. The coding and analysis stage of the survey process transforms raw data (the 
recorded measures in the responses) into information that can be used for 
decision making.   
7. Presentation of the results.  Once the coded data has been entered, it is a 
simple process to generate histograms and other charts to present the data.   
What is the best methodology? Research techniques need to be adapted to the 
evaluation objectives and board context.  In particular, the research designer needs to 
be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the various techniques.  Qualitative 
techniques provide rich data, but the logistics of collecting and analysing the data are 
difficult.  Further, qualitative data is generally interpreted by the researcher, which 
makes it more open to criticisms of bias and lack of validity.  Quantitative analysis, on 
the other hand, is based on reducing the data or phenomena in question to numbers.  
This is not nearly as informative as qualitative data, but can be readily collected from 
a large number of people or other sources.  It is also very easily consolidated, 
compared and/or benchmarked. 
The choice of techniques will depend on the board’s objectives.  If the board is trying 
to identify the source of a performance problem, qualitative data can help to identify 
the cause.  Similarly, if the objective of the evaluation is to understand member or 
owner views on a particular subject, qualitative data will be the most appropriate.  
However, if the board wants to compare its performance with other boards or over 
time, then quantitative techniques may be best.  Most boards will explore a range of 
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techniques as a means of investigating different performance issues and to keep the 
evaluation process fresh and interesting.  In this way, a regular evaluation cycle will 
continue to benefit the board. 
Who will do the evaluation? 
The next consideration in establishing your evaluation framework is to decide who the 
most appropriate person is to conduct the evaluation.  If the review is an internal one, 
the chairperson commonly conducts the evaluation.  However, there are times when it 
may be more appropriate to delegate either to a non-executive or lead director, or to a 
board committee.  In the case of external evaluations, specialist consultants or other 
general advisers with expertise in the areas of corporate governance and performance 
evaluation may lead the process.  Figure 6 illustrates the choices for determining who 
will perform the evaluation. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Internal reviews are traditionally the most common form of board evaluation and have 
a number of key advantages.  First, by conducting an internal review, the board is 
asserting its autonomy to set and apply its own standards (Berenbeim, 1994).  Board 
autonomy is a key source of power and conducting a self-evaluation demonstrates this 
authority at the same time as establishing the standards and culture of performance 
evaluation that the board expects of the rest of the organisation.  An internally 
conducted review also has the advantage of the confidentiality that comes with a 
board member conducting the process. Ultimately, the value of the evaluation will 
depend on the level of commitment that participants bring to the process.  Ensuring 
confidentiality through the appointment of a trusted insider can be an important aspect 
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of gaining this commitment and ensuring that feedback is open and honest.  Internally 
conducted board evaluations can be useful team-building exercises.  The ability of the 
board to function effectively as a team is a fundamental determinant of superior board 
performance.  Finally, internal reviews generally have the advantage of being a more 
cost-effective option.   
Although there are many benefits to internal evaluations, there are also a number of 
limitations that may make them inappropriate in certain circumstances.  The two 
major concerns involve issues of transparency and capability.  In many circumstances, 
boards undertake evaluations to demonstrate their commitment to performance 
improvement to both external and internal stakeholders.  In these cases, the question 
of “who watches the watchers” is a serious one.  If the board establishes the 
evaluation process, sets its objectives, evaluates its own members and prepares the 
final report on its own performance, it may be perceived as lacking transparency.   
Apart from transparency, boards need to ensure the nominated person/group has the 
capability to undertake the review.  An internal reviewer often brings (unconscious) 
biases to the process.  It is difficult for the chairperson, directors or 
corporate/company secretary to provide a totally objective view of the board’s 
performance when they work so closely together.  In particular, full and frank 
disclosure may be difficult for participants where the reviewer may be central to the 
governance issue.  Similarly, an internal reviewer may lack the skill set and capacity 
to conduct the review.  There are a number of very specific research skills invaluable 
to the evaluation process that an internally nominated reviewer may not possess.  For 
example, is the person charged with leading the evaluation a skilled interviewer and 
communicator?  Does he or she have sufficient experience in questionnaire design?  If 
the answer to these questions is “no”, an internal facilitator may not be the best 
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choice. Similarly, even where the evaluator does possess the skills, do they have the 
necessary time to carry out the tasks required? 
As depicted in Figure 6, either an individual (chairperson or non-executive director) 
or a committee (e.g., governance or nomination committee) can conduct an internal 
evaluation.  Finding the right person to conduct the process is an important part of 
determining whether an internal evaluation should be undertaken.  Table 4 summaries 
the advantages and disadvantages of internal reviewers. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are a number of situations where boards find it preferable to engage external 
consultants or advisers to facilitate the board evaluation.  Boards tend to seek external 
evaluation facilitators in two generalised circumstances, namely where there is a 
significant requirement for transparency and/or where the board does not have the 
capability to carry out the evaluation itself.  External consultants can also prove 
valuable in a number of special circumstances such as when the evaluation process 
has become too mechanical over time.  External consultants can recommend different 
questions and approaches, and assist the board to find a new focus for each 
evaluation.  Similarly, when a board is implementing an individual director 
assessment for the first time, the board may wish to consider an external facilitator.  
An external facilitator can play a useful mediating role if there are personality 
considerations in the review process.  Using a third party as the messenger of the 
evaluation outcomes also assists in maintaining board dynamics, while addressing 
difficult issues. Finally, an external facilitator can be useful if there has been a major 
board reorganisation.  
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The major decision for boards deciding to implement an external review is whether 
they should use a specialist consultant or trusted general adviser.  Some boards prefer 
to utilise a trusted adviser, such as the firm’s legal counsel or auditor, to conduct the 
evaluation.  This allows the board to work with people they already know and whom 
they believe understand the boardroom dynamics.   
In contrast, a specialist consultant has the advantages of often possessing a higher 
level of technical skill and being perceived as having a greater degree of 
independence.  The specialised nature of a board review requires skills often outside 
the customary scope of many general advisers.  Similarly, a consultant engaged 
specifically to carry out the evaluation can be perceived as more independent than a 
reviewer with an existing relationship with the firm (such as a general counsel or 
auditor), if that is an important consideration for the board.  Finally, specialist 
consultants will have a broad range of exposure to different boardroom practices and 
benchmarks, so if comparison and new ideas are key objectives, specialist consultants 
may be the answer. 
Whether choosing between a trusted adviser or specialist consultant, there are some 
important questions the board needs to consider: 
• Does the proposed facilitator have sufficient skills and experience to conduct 
an evaluation? 
• Has the facilitator conducted board evaluations for other boards like ours? 
• Does the facilitator have access to benchmarking information and alternative 
governance ideas that will add value to the process? 
• Will the facilitator be able to form a balanced and objective view of our 
board? 
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• Will the board trust the facilitator sufficiently to ensure a positive outcome? 
What do you do with the results? 
The review’s objectives should be the determining factor when deciding to whom the 
results will be released. Most often the board’s central objective will be to agree a 
series of actions that it can take to improve governance.  Since the effectiveness of an 
organisation’s governance system relies on people within the firm, communicating the 
results to internal stakeholders is critical for boards seeking performance 
improvement.  Given that virtually all governance reviews are conducted with a view 
to improving the governance system, boards are rarely faced with the decision of 
whether to communicate the results internally.  Rather, the decision is who within the 
organisation needs to know the results. 
Since the board as a whole is responsible for its performance, the results of the review 
will be released to the board in all but the most unusual of circumstances.  Where the 
evaluation objectives are focused entirely on the board, board members will simply 
discuss the results among themselves.  This occurs, for example, when the objective is 
to conduct a general review of the board’s performance, with a view to improving 
board process or gaining a shared understanding among board members as to roles or 
other items of interest.  Normally, the board and the corporate/company secretary will 
review the findings around the boardroom table, and there will be no need to 
communicate the results to anyone else.   
Where the results of the evaluation concern individual director performance, the 
generally accepted approach is for the chairperson and/or facilitator to discuss them 
individually, with each director.  This approach has three advantages.  First, it reflects 
good performance management principles and ethics by respecting the confidentiality 
of the process and the individual’s integrity.  Second, it ensures that difficult topics, 
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often avoided in the boardroom setting, have a venue for discussion.  Third, it does 
not rely on director self-diagnosis; there is a measure of objectivity and 
accountability, particularly where the director and chairperson/facilitator outline a 
development plan to which the director can be held accountable. 
The CEO has a significant influence on the governance system and is nearly always 
involved in the review of results.  The key decision here is whether informing the 
CEO would adversely affect board dynamics and solidarity.  Where board dynamics 
or individual relationships are major governance concerns, the principle of board 
solidarity may require it to hold an in camera session.   
In circumstances where the objective of the board evaluation is to assess the quality of 
board-management relationships, or where there are process issues concerning 
management input into board meetings and papers, results of the evaluation will 
generally be shared with the senior management team.  Some organisations choose to 
communicate a summary of the board evaluation results more widely in the 
organisation.  This can be particularly helpful where boards are seeking to inculcate a 
culture of performance management and accountability within the company.  
In certain circumstances, the board will have an objective of building its reputation for 
transparency and/or developing relationships with key external stakeholders.  In such 
circumstances, the board should consider communicating some or all of the results of 
its review to those stakeholders.  Communicating the results of the evaluation 
demonstrates that the board takes governance seriously and is committed to improving 
its performance.   
Additionally, depending upon who participated in the evaluation, the board may also 
wish to communicate results to key customers, suppliers or other groups important for 
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its continued success (e.g., unions, environmental groups).  Sharing information with 
these major groups is likely to persuade them that the board is committed to 
improving stakeholder relationships.  It also provides feedback to those who have 
been asked for their views on the board’s performance and can serve to strengthen 
their relationships with the board.   
The performance evaluation cycle 
Aside from the seven key questions in an evaluation, boards need to consider how 
often they should evaluate their performance.  Some boards decide to undertake 
reviews on an “as needs” basis.  This approach may be beneficial to boards that have a 
clearly articulated and understood policy on the triggers that will prompt a review.  
The difficulty with the “as needs” review is that, unless there are clear guidelines 
linking them to specific situations such as a change in board composition, 
performance evaluation is liable to be overlooked.   
When choosing to institute a regular review process, boards can institute frequent or 
longer-term cycles.  Some boards choose to hold a regular performance evaluation 
every two or three years.  These tend to be extensive appraisal processes, combining 
interviews and surveys and often involving an external facilitator.  The chief 
disadvantage of two or three-yearly reviews is that most businesses operate in a very 
dynamic environment and many changes will occur during this time frame.  
The annual review is the most commonly recommended form of board evaluation.   
This is consistent with the annual planning cycle adopted by most boards.  Some 
boards find it useful to tie board evaluation to the strategy formulation process.  This 
is a useful way of adapting performance expectations to fit the strategic needs of the 
organisation.  For those organisations operating in more dynamic business 
environments, however, annual reviews may not be frequent enough.  In high 
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technology industries, for example, a review of the board’s performance every six 
months may be more appropriate.  
Although the annual review is the most common form of evaluation, this does not 
necessarily make it the most effective.  There is always a danger that the predictable 
annual event will become stale and no longer add value.  If evaluation becomes too 
routine an activity, boards are in danger of becoming complacent.  In these 
circumstances, it is important to experiment with different evaluation styles and 
techniques to keep the process interesting and ensure that it continues to lead to 
performance improvements.  Notwithstanding the concern over the process becoming 
stale through repetition, a set of questions that provide specific, measurable data 
against which the board can benchmark its performance over time can further 
contribute to the board’s continuing improvement. 
Some commentators believe that performance evaluation should be an ongoing 
process, not just an annual event (e.g., Carver, 1997a).  High performing boards tend 
to devise other mechanisms apart from an annual review to ensure ongoing 
performance improvement.  One option is to review the effectiveness of each board 
meeting.  This can be scheduled as a regular agenda item, with directors taking turns 
to lead the discussion.  The technique involves the appointment of one board member 
to act as the “meeting evaluator”.  This person observes the participants, assesses the 
content and importance of items on the agenda and the quality of board papers.  The 
evaluator then gives his or her opinion in a five-minute review at the end of the 
meeting.  The other board members are then asked for their comments on the 
effectiveness of the meeting and to offer suggestions for improving performance.  The 
whole process is intended to last no more than 10 or 15 minutes.  This is a simple 
technique for keeping performance issues “front of mind” for the board.  It is an easy 
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way to gain quick feedback and to encourage discussion and interaction between 
board members, and it requires little time or effort to put in place. 
Conclusion 
Performance evaluation is becoming increasingly important for boards and directors.  
Pressure for improved evaluation is coming from two main sources.  First, some 
commentators are calling for mandatory performance appraisals to promote corporate 
transparency and accountability.  Second, there are clear performance benefits to 
companies when their leaders are willing to engage in an open and honest appraisal of 
their own performance. 
While compliance pressures for improved evaluations should be a consideration for 
all boards, we have concentrated on emphasising the performance benefits that are 
possible with rigorous board and individual director evaluation processes.  A key way 
for a board to demonstrate its commitment to continuing improvement is through 
critical evaluation. Therefore, a regular board evaluation process is an important 
process that can really add value.  It benefits individuals, boards and the companies 
for which they work. 
Boards also need to recognise that the evaluation process is an effective team-
building, ethics shaping activity.  Our observation is that boards often neglect the 
process of engagement when undertaking evaluations; unfortunately, boards that fail 
to engage their members are missing a major opportunity for developing a shared set 
of board norms and inculcating a positive board and organisation culture.  In short, the 
process is as important as the content.  In conclusion, implementing a robust and 
successful board and director evaluation is one important way to ensure that a board 
can avert governance failure and consequent organisational failure. 
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Table 1:  Potential benefits of board evaluation 
Benefits To organisation To board To individual directors 
Leadership ▪ Sets the performance 
tone and culture of the 
organisation 
▪ Role model for CEO 
and senior 
management team 
▪ An effective 
chairperson utilising a 
board evaluation 
demonstrates 
leadership to the rest 
of the board 
▪ Demonstrates long-
term focus of the 
board 
▪ Leadership behaviours 
agreed and 
encouraged 
▪ Demonstrates 
commitment to 
improvement at 
individual level 
Role clarity ▪ Enables clear 
distinction between 
the roles of the CEO, 
management and the 
board 
▪ Enables appropriate 
delegation principles 
▪ Clarifies director and 
committee roles 
▪ Sets a board norm for 
roles 
▪ Clarifies duties of 
individual directors  
▪ Clarifies protection of 
directors 
▪ Clarifies expectations 
Teamwork ▪ Builds board/CEO/ 
management 
relationships 
▪ Builds trust between 
board members 
▪ Encourages active 
participation 
▪ Develops commitment 
and sense of 
ownership 
▪ Encourages individual 
director involvement 
▪ Develops commitment 
and sense of 
ownership 
▪ Clarifies expectations 
Accountability  ▪ Improved stakeholder 
relationships, e.g., 
investors, financial 
markets 
▪ Improved corporate 
governance standards 
▪ Clarifies delegations 
▪ Focuses board 
attention on duties to 
stakeholders 
▪ Ensures board is 
appropriately 
monitoring 
organisation 
▪ Ensures directors 
understand their legal 
duties and 
responsibilities 
▪ Sets performance 
expectations for 
individual board 
members 
Decision making  ▪ Clarifying strategic 
focus and corporate 
goals 
▪ Improves 
organisational 
decision making 
▪ Clarifying strategic 
focus  
▪ Aids in the 
identification of skills 
gaps on the board 
▪ Improves the board’s 
decision-making ability 
▪ Identifies areas where 
director skills need 
development 
▪ Identifies areas where 
the director’s skills can 
be better utilised 
Communication ▪ Improves stakeholder 
relationships 
▪ Improves board-
management 
relationships 
▪ Improved board-CEO 
relationships 
▪ Improves board-
management 
relationships 
▪ Builds trust between 
board members 
▪ Builds personal 
relationships between 
individual directors 
Board operations ▪ Ensures an 
appropriate top-level 
policy framework 
exists to guide the 
organisation 
▪ More efficient 
meetings 
▪ Better time 
management 
▪ Saves directors’ time 
▪ Increases 
effectiveness of 
individual contributors 
Source: Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005 
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Table 2:  Skills of the board: topics and sample questions 
Topic Sample questionnaire items 
Defining governance roles 
1. Is the role of a board member clearly defined? Role of the board 
2. Is the role of a board member well understood? 
3. Does the spread of talent within the board reflect the company’s needs? 
4. Do all board members bring valuable skills and experience to the company? Board structure 
5. Is the board large enough to carry out the work required of it? 
Improving board processes 
6. Do the board papers contain the correct amount and type of information? 
7. Are board members diligent in preparing for meetings? Board meetings 
8. Are matters relating to the company discussed in a structured manner? 
Key board functions 
9. Does the board know and understand the company’s mission, vision and 
strategy? 
10. Does the board know and keep abreast of trends and issues affecting the 
market in which the company competes? 
Strategy 
11. Does the board understand the business it is governing? 
Service/advice/ 
contacts 
12. Do board members actively engage in networking for the benefit of the 
company? 
Monitoring 13. Do board members have sufficient financial skills to ensure the board can discharge its governance responsibilities? 
Compliance 14. Does the company have relevant internal reporting and compliance systems? 
15. Are board members aware of their risk assessment duties as directors? Risk 
management 16. Is there a clear understanding of the company’s business risk? 
Continuing improvement 
Director 
development 
17. Does the board encourage directors to pursue opportunities for personal 
development? 
18. Does the board have a succession plan in place for the chairperson? 
19. Does the board have a director succession plan in place? Director selection and 
induction 20. Are there clear and well understood policies and procedures in place for 
director selection and induction? 
 
 39
Table 3:  Who has the knowledge? 
Category Information sources Knowledge benefits Potential drawbacks 
Board 
members 
▪ Should have key knowledge on 
skills, processes, relationships, 
level of shared understanding 
▪ Suffer from biases (such as 
groupthink) 
▪ Little understanding of external 
perceptions of the board 
▪ Do not provide a “set of fresh 
eyes” with which to examine 
governance processes 
CEO 
▪ Should have a different perspective 
on all elements of board activity 
▪ Key insight into the advice role of 
board 
▪ Key insight into succession issues 
▪ Potentially suffers from biases 
▪ Potentially impression manages 
for the board, particularly on 
issues of management activities 
▪ May have a limited or biased 
understanding of external 
perceptions 
Senior 
managers 
▪ Generally good insights into 
communication between the board 
and management 
▪ May not have enough exposure 
to the board 
▪ May be tainted by internal 
company politics 
Internal 
sources 
Other 
employees 
▪ Should have insight into the culture 
of the organisation 
▪ The further removed from the 
board, the less likely employees 
can comment on actual 
performance 
▪ Limited exposure to the board 
Owners/ 
members ▪ Understand ownership aims 
▪ Will depend on the ownership 
structure (may be disparate) 
Customers 
▪ Can have unique insights, 
particularly if the company has very 
few customers 
▪ Most likely will have little insight 
into how the board operates 
▪ Potential to “game” the system  
Government 
▪ Can have insightful views, 
particularly in certain areas of 
compliance, if these are critical 
▪ Often limited interaction with most 
companies 
Suppliers 
▪ Can have unique insights, 
particularly if the company has very 
few suppliers 
▪ Most likely will have little insight 
into how the board operates 
External 
experts 
▪ Useful benchmarking or best 
practice insights 
▪ May not understand company’s 
context 
External 
sources 
Other 
stakeholders 
▪ Will depend on nature of the 
company 
▪ Will depend on nature of the 
company 
 
Source: Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005 
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Table 4:  Chairperson, non-executive director and committee evaluations 
Chairperson  Non-executive director  Committee 
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages
• Part of 
leadership role 
– clear 
acceptance by 
board 
members 
• Clear 
accountability 
• Can align 
process with 
overall board 
agenda 
• Possible bias 
• Concentration 
of power, 
particularly if 
the CEO is 
chairperson 
• Heavy 
workload 
• Clear 
accountability 
• More 
independent 
view 
• More time to 
devote to task 
• Other 
leadership 
experiences/ 
skills 
• Possible bias 
• Possible effect 
on board 
dynamics 
• Knowledge of 
the company 
will be less 
than that of the 
chairperson 
• Relieves 
chairperson/ 
non-executive 
director of 
workload 
• Less reliant on 
the viewpoint 
of one person 
• Less subject to 
individual bias 
• Longer 
process 
• Demands 
greater 
resources 
(time, money 
etc.) 
 
Source: Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005 
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Figure 1:  Framework for a board evaluation 
What are our objectives?hat are our objectives?
Who will be evaluated?ho will be evaluated?
What will be evaluated?hat will be evaluated?
Who will be asked?ho will be asked?
What techniques will be used?hat techniques will be used?
Who will do the evaluation?ho will do the evaluation?
What will you do with the results?hat will you do with the results?  
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Figure 2:  Who will be evaluated? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establish objectives and 
scope of evaluation
Establish objectives and 
scope of evaluation
BoardBoard Governance personnel
Governance 
personnel
Board as a 
whole
Board as a 
hole
Board 
committees
Board 
co ittees
DirectorsDirectors
ChairpersonChairperson
Lead 
independent 
director
Lead 
independent 
director
Individual 
directors
Individual 
directors CEOCE
Company
secretary
Co pany
secretary
 43
Figure 3:  The Corporate Governance Charter model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kiel & Nicholson, 2003 
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Figure 4:  Who will be asked? 
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Figure 5:  Evaluation techniques 
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Figure 6:  Who conducts the board evaluation? 
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Evaluating Boards and Directors 
 
Abstract 
The challenge for boards is to prevent crises in the organisations they govern. 
Performance evaluation is a key means by which boards can recognise and correct 
corporate governance problems and add real value to their organisations.  Our paper 
provides a practical introduction to board and director evaluations. We discuss the 
reasons for governance failures and how board evaluations can help prevent them 
from occurring.  We then review the performance pressures facing boards and the 
benefits of board evaluations in meeting these pressures.  Finally, we introduce our 
framework for a successful board and/or individual director evaluation, whatever the 
company type.  In this framework, we suggest there are seven key questions to 
consider when planning a board evaluation and discuss each of these seven decision 
areas. 
Keywords:  Boards of directors; Performance evaluation; Corporate governance 
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Evaluating Boards and Directors* 
Behavioral psychologists and organizational learning experts agree that 
people and organizations cannot learn without feedback. No matter how 
good a board is, it’s bound to get better if it’s reviewed intelligently 
(Sonnenfeld, 2002: 113). 
Corporate governance issues continue to receive a high profile in the business press. 
Recent problems at Disney and Fannie Mae in the United States, and the massive 
losses at Marconi plc in the United Kingdom, add to the litany of governance failures 
and scandals that have characterised big business in the 21st century.  These failures 
underscore the fact that boards must be concerned with more than organisational and 
management performance, they also need to review their own performance.  Board 
evaluation is a significant way for boards to show they are serious about their 
performance, and as Sonnenfeld astutely observes in the above quotation, even good 
boards can benefit from a properly conducted evaluation.  Unfortunately, while 
“[m]ost people are interested in doing an evaluation...they’re quite ignorant about how 
to do it” (Bob Garratt qtd in Bingham, 2003).  This paper provides a practical 
introduction to board and director evaluations. 
To begin, we discuss reasons behind governance failures and how board evaluations 
can help prevent them.  We then highlight the significant performance pressures 
boards now face and the benefits of board evaluation in helping meet these pressures.  
In the third section of the paper, we introduce our framework for a successful board 
and/or individual director evaluation.  In this framework, we suggest there are seven 
key questions to consider when planning a board evaluation and discuss each of the 
                                                 
* This paper was presented at the 7th International Conference on Corporate Governance and Board 
Leadership, 11-13 October 2004 at the Centre for Board Effectiveness, Henley Management College. 
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seven decision areas for the board evaluation process.  Whether a company is listed on 
the stock exchange, a small family company or a not-for-profit organisation, the 
framework can be used to develop an evaluation process appropriate to the 
organisation.   
Governance failures 
Governance failures may result in either a significant reduction in, or total destruction 
of, shareholder wealth. There are also a broader set of economic and social 
ramifications that come with the closure of businesses and loss of jobs and retirement 
benefits. Given the widespread implications of corporate failure, it is important to 
understand how boards contribute to this failure.  We provide four categories for these 
failures: strategic, control, ethical and interpersonal relationship.  Often these failures 
are interrelated. For example, at Enron, the board failed in the areas of strategy, 
control and, arguably, ethics, while at Hollinger International there were failures in 
the areas of control and ethics.  The following examples illustrate the four categories 
of governance failure: 
1. Strategic failure: with full board approval, the managing director of UK 
corporation Marconi plc disposed of the company’s engineering, electrical and 
defence products businesses despite these being the foundation of the 
company’s success.  The company, again with board approval, launched into 
an ill-considered and ill-timed strategy aimed at turning Marconi into a cutting 
edge technology firm (Court, 2003);  
2. Control failure: the board of Barings plc oversaw an inadequate risk 
management system that resulted in losses estimated to be in the vicinity of 
₤927 million.  As a result, rogue trader Nick Leeson brought down the 
merchant bank (Hogan, 1997);  
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3. Ethical failure:  in an attempt to remove potential asbestos liabilities from the 
company’s books, Australian building products company James Hardie 
Industries restructured its business through the incorporation of a new parent 
company in the Netherlands. During the process it transferred responsibility 
for asbestos compensation to a medical foundation that was found to be under-
funded (Buffini, 2004). The company is still battling the reputation damage of 
the board’s decision; and  
4. Interpersonal relationship failure:  the board of Walt Disney Co. has earned the 
ire of institutional investors for its lack of an independent board.  Boardroom 
battles between then chairman and CEO Michael Eisner and dissident board 
members Roy Disney and Stanley Gold, who subsequently resigned to lead a 
campaign to oust Eisner, have become the stuff of legend (CBSNEWS.com, 
2003).  
We could continue this litany of examples of corporate failure and even debate the 
categorisation of each failure.  But it is not our intention to document corporate 
failures, rather it is to assist boards improve themselves, so as to minimise failure 
from strategic ineptitude, lack of controls, dishonesty or poor dynamics.   
Board evaluations provide a process for boards to identify sources of failure.  They 
allow boards to diagnose areas of concern before they reach crisis point.  For 
example, a board evaluation can ask the directors how well the board is performing 
the strategy role and whether they feel comfortable that they are adding value in the 
strategy generation process.  Similar questions can be asked about the monitoring and 
control role of the board.  A well-designed evaluation, covering both board-as-a-
whole and individual director evaluation, is likely to raise the issue of ethical concerns 
among some directors in relation to others or management.  The same comments can 
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be made for interpersonal relationship failure.  A well-designed board evaluation can 
serve to highlight potential issues and promote discussion and resolution before 
concerns become major crises.  Board evaluations are not a universal panacea for all 
board ills.  However, used correctly and regularly, they may play a major role in 
averting a governance failure. 
The pressure to perform 
Averting corporate failure is not the only pressure faced by boards; increasing 
demands for organisational performance are also increasing performance pressures on 
boards.  There are number of reasons for this.  First, as boards are held increasingly 
accountable for corporate performance, they become increasingly more proactive in 
the leadership of the companies they govern.  Effective leadership is seen as critical to 
establishing the tone of a corporation (i.e. its culture and values), developing a 
strategic direction, guiding change and formulating corporate objectives, and ensuring 
effective implementation takes place.  Holding boards accountable in these areas 
represents a fundamental shift in organisational thinking.  For close on 100 years, the 
chief executive, supported by his or her management team, was largely seen as totally 
responsible for these areas.  Today, underpinned by theoretical developments in 
agency theory (e.g., Hendry, 2002), and fuelled by tales of corporate excesses such as 
Hollinger International (Aylmer, 2004) and Tyco (Bianco, Symonds, Byrnes and 
Polek, 2002), shareholders, legislators and society at large are increasingly demanding 
that boards demonstrate leadership and control.  After all, they are the peak body in 
organisations.  In short, the role of the board has changed from management support 
to organisational leadership.  This represents a paradigm shift in management 
thinking, the full implications of which are just dawning upon companies and 
commentators alike (Pound, 1995). 
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Second, and related to the first reason, there has been a dramatic rise in shareholder 
activism over the past two decades.  The main reason for this increased activism is the 
increase in power of large institutional investors, who are becoming far more 
demanding of boards.  This trend is seen internationally with large pension funds in 
the US (such as CalPERS) being vocal advocates for governance reform.  Thus, 
despite mixed findings on the empirical links between corporate governance and firm 
performance (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson 
and Ellstrand, 1999; Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2000), there is a 
discernable and growing belief in the investment community that good governance 
will enhance corporate outcomes.  Institutional investors perceive that the board can 
directly enhance shareholder value by intervening in the case of corporate crises, 
providing strategic guidance and selecting and monitoring the CEO (Conger, Lawler 
and Finegold, 2001).  As a result, more than 80% of European and US institutional 
investors say they will pay more for companies with good governance (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2001). The onus on boards to improve performance is further 
strengthened by the ability of shareholders and investors to assess the corporate 
governance practices of major corporations through ratings systems such as those 
developed by Standard & Poor’s (2003) and the Corporate Library (2004), which rate 
board effectiveness using factors such as board composition, director tenure and CEO 
compensation. 
In addition to leadership responsibilities and shareholder activism, there is an 
increasing media and community scrutiny of all aspects of corporate life.  Names such 
as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco International in the US, along with Marconi and 
Barings in the UK and HIH Insurance in Australia, have come to symbolise a 
breakdown in corporate ethics and boards are squarely in the firing line.  Society at 
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large is beginning to lay the blame for poor corporate decision making (such as at 
Marconi) and systems failures (such as Baring’s risk management controls) directly at 
the feet of the board.  It appears this scrutiny will continue and only serves to intensify 
community expectations that boards need to be brought to account for the 
performance of the companies they govern.  
For these reasons boards are turning to board evaluation as a major tool to assist them 
in improving their performance.  This global trend sees specific board evaluation 
recommendations forming a key component of nearly every major corporate 
governance review or report.  For example, the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2003) in Australia, Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture 
(Saucier, 2001) in Canada, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Combined 
Code) (Financial Reporting Council, 2003) in the U.K., and the Principles of 
Corporate Governance (A White Paper from the Business Roundtable, May 2002) 
(Business Roundtable, 2002) in the U.S., all make specific recommendations for the 
regular review of board performance.   
The benefits of an evaluation to a board are numerous.  If conducted properly, board 
evaluations can contribute significantly to performance improvements on three levels 
– the organisational, board and individual director level.  Boards who commit to a 
regular evaluation process find benefits across these levels in terms of improved 
leadership, greater clarity of roles and responsibilities, improved teamwork, greater 
accountability, better decision making, improved communication and more efficient 
board operations.  Table 1 summarises the potential benefits of board evaluation to the 
organisation, the board as a whole and to individual directors.  It must be stressed, 
however, that these benefits can only arise from a properly executed board evaluation.  
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Board and director evaluations, if incorrectly executed, can lead to distrust among 
board members and between the board and management. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The board evaluation framework 
Following is a framework for conducting positive board and director evaluations.  
Although boards differ in the severity of their performance problems, the competitive 
environment in which they work and the range of performance issues they face, there 
are a number of key decisions that are relevant to all boards implementing an 
evaluation process.  Our framework for a successful board or individual director 
evaluation relies on the board reaching agreement on the answers to the seven key 
questions illustrated in Figure 1 (Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005).  While the 
seven questions must be asked for all board evaluations, the combined answers can be 
quite different.  As a result, while the questions are common to each, board 
evaluations can range markedly in their scope, complexity and cost.  While we 
describe our framework as a sequential series of events, in practice most boards will 
not follow such a linear process.  Some of these decision areas will be reached 
simultaneously, for example, “who will be evaluated” may be decided at the same 
time as “who will conduct the evaluation”.  Similarly, external issues may dominate 
the approach (e.g., scarce resources may dictate an internal review).  However, at 
some point, each of these questions will need to be answered.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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What are our objectives? 
The first stage of the board evaluation process is to establish what the board hopes to 
achieve.  Clearly identified objectives enable the board to set specific goals for the 
evaluation and make decisions about the scope of the review.  Such issues as the 
complexity of the performance problem, the size of the board, the stage of 
organisational life cycle and significant developments in the firm’s competitive 
environment will determine the issues the board wishes to evaluate.  Similarly, the 
scope of the review – how many people will be involved, how much time and money 
to allocate – will be determined by the severity of the problems facing the board and 
the availability of sufficient resources (human, financial and time) to carry out an 
evaluation.   
The first decision for most boards to consider is the overriding motivation for the 
evaluation process.  Generally, the answer to this question will fall into one of the 
following two categories: (1) corporate leadership (for example, “We want to clearly 
demonstrate our commitment to performance management”, “We believe reviewing 
our performance is essential to good governance”, “We want to provide directors with 
guidance for their learning and growth”) or (2) problem resolution (for example, “We 
are not sure if we are carrying out good governance”, “Our governance (or some 
specific aspect) is ineffective and/or inefficient”, “There are problems in the dynamics 
in the boardroom”, “We do not seem to have the appropriate skills, competencies or 
motivation on the board”). 
Many boards find that establishing the specific objectives for the review is best 
delegated to a small group (such as the governance committee or nomination 
committee if you have one) or an individual (such as the chairperson or lead 
independent director).  In this case, the first step is for the board to request the group 
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or person to document the specific objectives for the process.  At this stage you may 
also wish to consider consulting with an external adviser to overcome any board 
“blind spots” or biases.  The second approach involves the board as a whole 
discussing and agreeing the objectives of the board evaluation.  Generally an 
individual, usually the chairperson or chair of the governance or nomination 
committee, is delegated the task of leading the process. 
With clear objectives, it is relatively easy to decide whose performance will be 
evaluated, who the most appropriate people are to assess performance and the person 
or group best suited to conducting an evaluation.   
Who will be evaluated? 
With the objectives for the evaluation set, the board needs to decide whose 
performance will be reviewed to meet them.  Comprehensive governance evaluations 
can entail reviewing the performance of a wide range of individuals and groups, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.  Boards need to consider three groups: the board as whole 
(including board committees), individual directors (including the roles of chairperson 
and/or lead independent director), and key governance personnel (generally the CEO 
and corporate/company secretary).  Pragmatic considerations such as cost or time 
constraints, however, often preclude such a wide-ranging review.  Alternatively, a 
board may have a very specific objective for the review process that does not require 
the review of all individuals and groups identified in Figure 2.  In both cases, an 
effective evaluation requires the board to select the most appropriate individuals or 
groups to review based on its objectives.  To make this decision, we recommend a 
four-stage process that gradually filters a comprehensive list of possible review 
participants to a pragmatic selection of review subjects. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first stage in the process involves identifying the roles that clearly impact on the 
board’s review objectives and compiling a comprehensive list of individuals or groups 
that affect this objective.  For instance, a review designed to improve the flow of 
information to the board will have a long list of possible candidates for the review.  
The CEO is an obvious candidate, as he or she will be responsible for developing and 
delivering the bulk of board papers and information.  The board will also need to 
consider its own role in specifying its information requirements to the individuals and 
groups responsible for meeting those requirements.  The board also needs to consider 
the role of other personnel such as the corporate/company secretary. 
The second stage involves assessing the potential benefit(s) of including each 
candidate (group or individual) in the review.  Documenting these benefits ensures the 
board will have a common understanding of the relative merits of reviewing each 
candidate when deciding who to include.  Categorising the specific advantages of 
each candidate as critical, useful, or ancillary will assist in your decision making.  For 
the third stage, it is necessary to estimate the time and cost implications of evaluating 
the performance of the candidates in question.   
The final stage in deciding who to evaluate involves balancing the benefits and costs 
of reviewing each of the candidates.  While it is not possible to provide universal, 
prescriptive guidance, the principle is to ensure that all candidates with a major 
impact on the desired objective are reviewed.  The relative importance of each 
candidate will need to be considered in light of the importance of the review 
objective, the relative importance of potential candidates, and the relevant cost 
implications. 
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The most common issue in deciding who to evaluate is whether to concentrate on 
board-as-a-whole or individual director assessment. Regular evaluation of the board 
as a whole can be seen as a process that ensures directors develop a shared 
understanding of their governance role and responsibilities.  Although board-as-a-
whole evaluation is excellent as a familiarisation tool for inexperienced boards, one 
disadvantage is that group evaluation may give only limited insight into performance 
problems.  Consequently, some boards choose to progress to the evaluation of board 
committees, individual directors and the chairperson to gain greater insight into how 
their board is functioning.   
Individual evaluation, in particular, provides the board with an opportunity to probe 
particular issues in depth.  To evaluate individual directors, either self- or peer-
evaluation techniques can be used.  The aim of self evaluation is to encourage 
directors to reflect on their contributions to board activities and have them identify 
their personal strengths and weaknesses.  However, while useful for personal 
reflection and development, self assessment is inappropriate when the board wants an 
objective view of the individual’s performance.  An objective view is best gained 
through peer evaluation, whereby directors identify each other’s individual strengths 
and weaknesses.  By having members of the board evaluate each other, it is possible 
to gain a more rounded picture of the strengths and weaknesses of each director and 
their contribution to the effectiveness of the board.  It can also be used to identify 
skills gaps on the board.  Peer assessment is also more likely to reveal why the board 
is experiencing team performance or ethical dilemmas.   
There is the potential, however, to create serious conflict within the board if 
individual performance evaluation is introduced when some directors are opposed to 
the process.  Board members are entitled to hold differing views on the benefits of 
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individual director evaluation, but consensus must be reached before introducing the 
process.  If directors are willing to at least trial this approach, research evidence 
suggests that many directors find individual director evaluation an extremely 
beneficial process (Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001: 112). 
What will be evaluated? 
Having established the objectives of the evaluation and the people/groups that will be 
evaluated to achieve those objectives, the next stage involves the evaluation becoming 
specific.  It is now necessary to elaborate these objectives into a number of specific 
topics to ensure that the evaluation (1) clarifies any potential problems, (2) identifies 
the root cause(s) of these problems, and (3) tests the practicality of specific 
governance solutions, wherever possible.  This is necessary whether the board is 
seeking general or specific performance improvements and will suit boards seeking to 
improve areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and 
motivation, or even boardroom relationships. 
When an organisation is facing a significant governance issue or a board is seeking to 
improve its performance, there is rarely a single issue that requires review.  The vast 
majority of governance concerns are, in fact, the result of the interplay between 
individual skills, experience and motivations; the relationships between the board and 
management; and the effectiveness of supporting governance policies, procedures and 
processes (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  Consequently, while there may be a single 
objective for a board review, it is imperative for the evaluation process to examine a 
wide range of potential causes or influences on this objective.   
We suggest that boards consider their specific objectives in light of a best practice 
corporate governance framework. The framework acts as a “lens” through which to 
view the objectives and allows the board to develop a comprehensive list of potential 
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areas for investigation.  Of course, a comprehensive list of areas for investigation will 
need to be balanced with the scope of the evaluation and the resources available for 
the project.  This stage requires the person leading the evaluation to take a realistic 
assessment of the resources available, a key component of which is the time 
availability of directors and other key governance personnel, such as the CEO and 
corporate/company secretary. 
There are a number of frameworks against which boards can assess their performance.  
Specific examples of governance frameworks that boards can use to refine their 
evaluation objectives include John Carver’s (1997b) Policy Governance model, the 
UK’s Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2003), the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD Principles) (OECD, 2004), the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s (2003) Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations and Kiel and 
Nicholson’s (2003) Corporate Governance Charter framework.  It is worth reviewing 
each in turn. 
John Carver (1997b) recommends frequent board self-assessment in his Policy 
Governance model.  This is done by comparing the board’s performance to the 
policies it has developed.  Under Carver’s model, the board is responsible for the job 
of governing, not managing the organisation.   In order to carry out its leadership role, 
the board produces four categories of policies:  
1. Ends: the policies which specify organisational outcomes for the recipients 
and costs of the intended outcomes;  
2. Executive limitations: the policies that limit executive authority;  
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3. Governance process: the policies that define how the board operates, and 
expectations of the board as a whole, individual directors, executives, and 
committees; and  
4. Board-management relationship: policies on the board’s delegation of 
power and monitoring of its use by the CEO.   
The aim of the Combined Code is to enhance board effectiveness and to improve 
investor confidence by raising standards of corporate governance in the U.K.  The 
Combined Code’s main and supporting principles provide a framework through which 
a board could develop a set of topics or questions for board evaluation.  For example, 
Section 1A.3 (Board balance and independence) could form the core criterion for the 
evaluation of a board on the question of whether it has the proper structure (which 
includes the skills and experience that should be represented on the board) and size to 
adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties.  This section could also be used to 
clarify what those responsibilities and duties entail.  The Combined Code also 
provides specific advice on board evaluations (Financial Reporting Council, 2003).  It 
suggests boards should be asked to consider “How well has the board performed 
against any performance objectives that have been set?” and “What has been the 
board’s contribution to the testing and development of strategy?” (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2003: 77).  Similarly, the OECD Principles outline how to implement a 
corporate governance framework and as such are a suitable model around which to 
develop evaluation criteria.   
In Australia, the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations contains 10 principles of good governance which are voluntary; 
however, ASX-listed companies that do not follow them are expected to explain why 
they do not. Corporate governance statements in the annual reports of companies 
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listed on the ASX indicate that these principles are being given close consideration.  
The principles and best practice recommendations developed by the Council provide 
another example of a framework through which a board could develop a set of topics 
or questions for board evaluation.  For example, the ASX principles encourage 
organisations to structure their boards to add value to the company (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003, 19).  This could form the core criterion for the evaluation 
of a board on the question of whether it has the proper structure (which includes the 
skills and experience that should be represented on the board) and size to adequately 
discharge its responsibilities and duties, and to clarify what those responsibilities and 
duties entail. 
The final example, Kiel and Nicholson’s Corporate Governance Charter framework, 
illustrated in Figure 3, is conceptualised as a wheel divided into four quadrants 
representing the essential elements of corporate governance.  The first quadrant 
“Defining governance roles” helps boards to define their roles and responsibilities, the 
second, “Improving board processes”, encourages board members to consider the 
effectiveness of their meeting procedures, agendas, board papers and minutes as well 
as the board calendar of events and ensuring efficient processes for board committees.  
The third describes “Key board functions” and the final quadrant, “Continuing 
improvement”, deals with the processes and procedures necessary for ensuring 
continuing improvement and corporate renewal. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The following example highlights how a board can use a framework to address their 
particular evaluation objectives.  Boards often set an objective of identifying any 
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skills gaps on the board.  Generally, this topic arises when there have been major 
changes in the strategy or competitive environment of an organisation and the board 
sees a need to review its skill set.  Choosing what to evaluate in these circumstances 
will depend on such issues as board size and structure, as well as how the board 
executes its key functions (e.g., strategy formulation, service, monitoring, compliance 
and risk management).  Only by reflecting on these topics can a board understand 
what skills it needs. 
When the evaluation objective is to identify skills gaps, the board may also need to 
consider how it will resolve any gaps.  Does the board adequately promote director 
development?  Is there a director development budget?  Or would it be more 
appropriate to appoint someone with the appropriate skills to the board?  If 
recruitment is an option, does the board have in place selection and induction 
procedures that will enable the board to recruit a new board member with suitable 
skills?  Table 2 provides a selection of questions developed from the Corporate 
Governance Charter model to be used in evaluating the board as a whole. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Deciding what to evaluate is one of the most difficult and yet critical components of 
the evaluation process.  The evaluator faces a delicate balancing act between ensuring 
the questioning is extensive enough to identify the root cause(s) of the issue, yet 
manageable enough to satisfy the scope and resource constraints of the review.   
Who will be asked? 
In our experience, the vast majority of board and director evaluations concentrate 
exclusively on the board (and perhaps the CEO) as the sole sources of information for 
 19
the evaluation process. As Figure 4 illustrates, this discounts numerous potentially 
rich sources of feedback on the performance of the governance system.  As the 
diagram highlights, participants in the evaluation can be drawn from within or from 
outside the company. Internally, board members, the CEO, senior managers and, in 
some cases, other management personnel and employees may have the necessary 
information to provide feedback on elements of a company’s governance system.  
Externally, owners/members and even financial markets can provide valuable data for 
the review.  Similarly, in some situations, government departments, major customers 
and suppliers may have close links with the board and be in a position to provide 
useful information on its performance. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In each board evaluation, the facilitator will need to decide the appropriateness of 
each potential participant’s knowledge to the particular performance issues being 
evaluated.  Generally, boards consult internal sources first.  One way of delineating 
between internal and external participants is to revisit the evaluation objectives and 
clarify whether the focus of the evaluation is on the skills, processes and relationships 
of the board or on the board’s effectiveness in carrying out its key roles.  For example, 
investigating the effectiveness of intra-board relationships is likely to be an 
exclusively internal process, where directors give their impressions of the 
performance of the board as a whole, their personal performance and possibly that of 
their peers.  In this situation, the board members themselves are the most qualified to 
comment on how they feel they work together as a team.  However, if an objective of 
the board is to improve stakeholder relationships, this will best be achieved by 
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gathering information from the stakeholders themselves.  Depending on the nature of 
the business, these may be owners, financial analysts, customers or suppliers critical 
to the organisation’s success.   
While these examples of intra-board relations and stakeholder relations represent 
clear-cut instances of the value of internal or external data sources, the board’s 
performance is often best evaluated by a combination of internal and external sources.  
Table 3 describes potential benefits and drawbacks of asking the various participants. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
After examining all potential sources of information along with their relative 
advantages and disadvantages, the facilitator must decide which sources to include in 
the review. This requires an understanding of three issues:  
1. in light of the specific questions identified in the previous step, who has the 
knowledge needed to make a valid and reliable assessment;  
2. what is the level of board experience with, and openness to, the evaluation 
process and what is the impact on who should be asked; and  
3. what resources are available to collect the information from the required 
sources. 
What techniques will be used? 
Depending on the degree of formality, the objectives of the evaluation, and the 
resources available, boards may choose between a range of qualitative and 
quantitative techniques.  Quantitative data are in the form of numbers.  They can be 
used to answer questions of how much or how many.  Qualitative data are not in the 
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form of numbers and will be required for any other type of research question.  Put 
simply, a question of “how much” should employ quantitative research methods, 
whereas questions of “what”, “how”, “why”, “when” and “where” should employ 
qualitative research methods.  Figure 5 provides an overview of the major qualitative 
and quantitative techniques used in board evaluations.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Most boards undertake evaluations without a clear view of the issues before them.  
When the evaluation’s objectives are to identify the key governance problems, screen 
alternative solutions and/or uncover new approaches, qualitative research comes to the 
fore.  Qualitative data does have several drawbacks, however.  The major drawback is 
that interpreting the results requires judgment on the part of the person undertaking 
the review and analysis.  Consequently, conclusions can be subject to considerable 
interpreter bias, even (or particularly) where the person conducting the review is a 
board or company member.  This is best addressed by using experienced researchers 
for the task and having several participants review the conclusions for bias.  Bias can 
also be mitigated by using both quantitative and qualitative techniques (e.g., using a 
survey in conjunction with interviews). 
While there are many different techniques for collecting qualitative data (e.g., 
projective techniques, word associations and role playing to name just a few), the 
three main methods used in governance evaluations are interviews, board observation 
and document analysis.  
The interview is the main qualitative data collection tool because it provides a unique 
opportunity to collect complex and rich data.  It is an excellent way of assessing 
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directors’ perceptions, meaning and constructions of reality by asking for information 
in a way that allows them to express themselves in their own terms.  Interviews may 
be conducted individually or in a group situation.  While interviews are essentially 
about asking questions and receiving answers, the key to uncovering rich information 
is a professional, well-designed interview process.   
By far the most common form of qualitative technique is the individual in-depth 
interview.  The key advantage of the individual interview is that it provides the 
conditions most likely to encourage candid disclosure of sensitive issues, particularly 
where confidentiality is assured. The confidentiality of the situation often encourages 
directors to disclose information that they may feel uncomfortable discussing in a 
group situation.  Thus, individual interviews can be a useful technique for certain 
subjects such as individual director evaluation.  The interview technique is 
particularly suitable for boards wanting to explore one or two major issues in some 
depth.  In-depth interviews are potentially a much richer source of information than 
quantitative data because the range of any discussion is open-ended.  They also prove 
useful when discussing “soft” issues, personal concerns and points of view that are 
not readily disclosed in a written questionnaire (Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001).   
In a group situation (often called a focus group), the interviewer works with several 
people simultaneously rather than individually.  The key difference for the interviewer 
is that he or she takes on the role of a moderator or facilitator, rather than that of an 
interviewer.  Rather than the question and answer pattern of the traditional interview, 
the interviewer uses group dynamics to stimulate discussion of the questions and 
topics of interest (Punch, 1998).  The key benefits of group-based interviews are that 
they are less resource intensive and can stimulate the participants to produce data and 
insights that would not be found without the group interaction.  Conversely, these 
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benefits need to be balanced with possible problems of group culture and dynamics 
that may inhibit candid disclosure.  It is also more difficult for the interviewer to 
establish rapport in a group setting.  We would not normally recommend employing 
group interviews where there are potentially sensitive issues under review. 
Another useful qualitative technique to consider is observation, particularly 
observation of a board meeting.  This technique involves the researcher observing the 
participants in their natural environment – the boardroom.  The researcher neither 
stimulates nor manipulates the participants (i.e. no questions are asked, etc.), but 
rather takes note of the participants’ behaviours, activities and points of interest to the 
research question.  
Observation has a number of advantages as a data collection technique.  Since the data 
is collected as events occur and is a record of what actually occurred, rather than what 
a director thought occurred, it is free from respondent bias, but is still subject to 
observer bias.  It is also easier to identify environmental influences (such as seating 
arrangements in the boardroom) on behaviours and can also be an effective way of 
seeing all board members in action at the one time.  Our experience is that observation 
can be especially useful when the evaluation objectives relate to issues of boardroom 
dynamics or relationships between individuals.  The observer can notice how board 
members relate to each other, if one or two people dominate discussions, whether the 
chairperson demonstrates a strong leadership role, if there is tension between board 
members, how the agenda works in practice and so on.  This information is valuable 
when used in conjunction with information gained from the directors themselves. 
Documents, both contemporary and historical, can be a rich source of information in 
the governance evaluation process.  While it is possible to categorise and/or directly 
code governance documentation, we recommend document analysis as a method of 
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triangulation for use in conjunction with other data collection techniques.  Reviewing 
key documents such as board papers, board minutes, policy manuals and governance 
charters, provides valuable insight into a governance system and a context in which to 
view the results of other data collection techniques (Punch, 1998).  A key benefit of 
document analysis is the questions it raises.  It can be as basic as why a particular 
document does not exist?  What level of detail is included?  What is recorded?  What 
is omitted?  What is the writer taking for granted?  Another benefit is that a review 
and categorisation of documents can assist an experienced facilitator to benchmark 
differences between the board’s documentation and that of other “best practice” 
boards.   
While quantitative data lack the richness of qualitative data, they have the key 
advantage of being specific and measurable.  This enables the evaluation to count, 
compare and contrast individual responses both over time and between individuals.  
Surveys are by far the most common form of quantitative technique used in 
governance evaluations and can be an important information-gathering tool.  It is vital 
to understand, however, that surveys are attitudinal instruments.  Surveys measure 
individuals’ subjective assessments of particular topics and are subject to responder 
bias.  The responses are no more or less valid than qualitative research.  
As with qualitative techniques, surveys can be used as the sole source of information 
for the evaluation, or as one of several data gathering techniques.  If the survey is the 
only method employed to gather data, it will necessarily be more extensive than if it is 
used in conjunction with other techniques.  If it is being used as a component of a 
governance evaluation, the facilitator will have a key decision to make about the 
timing of the survey.  Will the survey draw on the results of interviews (i.e. will the 
questions in the survey be based on what directors identified as key issues) to 
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quantitatively assess what has been identified qualitatively, or will the survey be 
administered as a stand-alone tool?  The answer to this question will depend on the 
objectives of the evaluation and the context of the review.  Often, pragmatic issues 
such as resources or time constraints dictate the response. 
In order to conduct a survey-based board evaluation we suggest following a seven-
step process:   
1. Specifying the objectives of the survey, in light of the evaluation’s overall 
objectives.   
2. Deciding the composition of the survey sample, that is, who will be asked to 
complete the survey?  Is it intended just for board members, or will others, 
such as the senior management team and the CEO, or external stakeholders be 
involved?   
3. Determining how the survey will be administered.  A common way to 
administer the survey is face-to-face, in a situation where the survey is just one 
part of evaluating the board’s performance.  Survey data can also be collected 
by phone, fax or email, or via the internet, which means that directors can 
complete them at a time and place suitable for them.   
4. Designing the questionnaire.  Excellent surveys support the purpose of the 
evaluation – the topics chosen are relevant to the evaluation requirements, the 
questions are worded in such a way as to gain the maximum relevant 
information and to avoid bias, and the measurement technique chosen is most 
appropriate for the information being sought (Kraut, 1996).   
5. Administering the questionnaire.  This involves the fieldwork necessary to 
undertake the board survey, including advising participants of the time and 
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place for the meeting (if a group survey is being conducted), scheduling 
appointments (for individual surveys), or sending the questions by mail, fax or 
email (as an attachment).   
6. The coding and analysis stage of the survey process transforms raw data (the 
recorded measures in the responses) into information that can be used for 
decision making.   
7. Presentation of the results.  Once the coded data has been entered, it is a 
simple process to generate histograms and other charts to present the data.   
What is the best methodology? Research techniques need to be adapted to the 
evaluation objectives and board context.  In particular, the research designer needs to 
be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the various techniques.  Qualitative 
techniques provide rich data, but the logistics of collecting and analysing the data are 
difficult.  Further, qualitative data is generally interpreted by the researcher, which 
makes it more open to criticisms of bias and lack of validity.  Quantitative analysis, on 
the other hand, is based on reducing the data or phenomena in question to numbers.  
This is not nearly as informative as qualitative data, but can be readily collected from 
a large number of people or other sources.  It is also very easily consolidated, 
compared and/or benchmarked. 
The choice of techniques will depend on the board’s objectives.  If the board is trying 
to identify the source of a performance problem, qualitative data can help to identify 
the cause.  Similarly, if the objective of the evaluation is to understand member or 
owner views on a particular subject, qualitative data will be the most appropriate.  
However, if the board wants to compare its performance with other boards or over 
time, then quantitative techniques may be best.  Most boards will explore a range of 
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techniques as a means of investigating different performance issues and to keep the 
evaluation process fresh and interesting.  In this way, a regular evaluation cycle will 
continue to benefit the board. 
Who will do the evaluation? 
The next consideration in establishing your evaluation framework is to decide who the 
most appropriate person is to conduct the evaluation.  If the review is an internal one, 
the chairperson commonly conducts the evaluation.  However, there are times when it 
may be more appropriate to delegate either to a non-executive or lead director, or to a 
board committee.  In the case of external evaluations, specialist consultants or other 
general advisers with expertise in the areas of corporate governance and performance 
evaluation may lead the process.  Figure 6 illustrates the choices for determining who 
will perform the evaluation. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Internal reviews are traditionally the most common form of board evaluation and have 
a number of key advantages.  First, by conducting an internal review, the board is 
asserting its autonomy to set and apply its own standards (Berenbeim, 1994).  Board 
autonomy is a key source of power and conducting a self-evaluation demonstrates this 
authority at the same time as establishing the standards and culture of performance 
evaluation that the board expects of the rest of the organisation.  An internally 
conducted review also has the advantage of the confidentiality that comes with a 
board member conducting the process. Ultimately, the value of the evaluation will 
depend on the level of commitment that participants bring to the process.  Ensuring 
confidentiality through the appointment of a trusted insider can be an important aspect 
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of gaining this commitment and ensuring that feedback is open and honest.  Internally 
conducted board evaluations can be useful team-building exercises.  The ability of the 
board to function effectively as a team is a fundamental determinant of superior board 
performance.  Finally, internal reviews generally have the advantage of being a more 
cost-effective option.   
Although there are many benefits to internal evaluations, there are also a number of 
limitations that may make them inappropriate in certain circumstances.  The two 
major concerns involve issues of transparency and capability.  In many circumstances, 
boards undertake evaluations to demonstrate their commitment to performance 
improvement to both external and internal stakeholders.  In these cases, the question 
of “who watches the watchers” is a serious one.  If the board establishes the 
evaluation process, sets its objectives, evaluates its own members and prepares the 
final report on its own performance, it may be perceived as lacking transparency.   
Apart from transparency, boards need to ensure the nominated person/group has the 
capability to undertake the review.  An internal reviewer often brings (unconscious) 
biases to the process.  It is difficult for the chairperson, directors or 
corporate/company secretary to provide a totally objective view of the board’s 
performance when they work so closely together.  In particular, full and frank 
disclosure may be difficult for participants where the reviewer may be central to the 
governance issue.  Similarly, an internal reviewer may lack the skill set and capacity 
to conduct the review.  There are a number of very specific research skills invaluable 
to the evaluation process that an internally nominated reviewer may not possess.  For 
example, is the person charged with leading the evaluation a skilled interviewer and 
communicator?  Does he or she have sufficient experience in questionnaire design?  If 
the answer to these questions is “no”, an internal facilitator may not be the best 
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choice. Similarly, even where the evaluator does possess the skills, do they have the 
necessary time to carry out the tasks required? 
As depicted in Figure 6, either an individual (chairperson or non-executive director) 
or a committee (e.g., governance or nomination committee) can conduct an internal 
evaluation.  Finding the right person to conduct the process is an important part of 
determining whether an internal evaluation should be undertaken.  Table 4 summaries 
the advantages and disadvantages of internal reviewers. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are a number of situations where boards find it preferable to engage external 
consultants or advisers to facilitate the board evaluation.  Boards tend to seek external 
evaluation facilitators in two generalised circumstances, namely where there is a 
significant requirement for transparency and/or where the board does not have the 
capability to carry out the evaluation itself.  External consultants can also prove 
valuable in a number of special circumstances such as when the evaluation process 
has become too mechanical over time.  External consultants can recommend different 
questions and approaches, and assist the board to find a new focus for each 
evaluation.  Similarly, when a board is implementing an individual director 
assessment for the first time, the board may wish to consider an external facilitator.  
An external facilitator can play a useful mediating role if there are personality 
considerations in the review process.  Using a third party as the messenger of the 
evaluation outcomes also assists in maintaining board dynamics, while addressing 
difficult issues. Finally, an external facilitator can be useful if there has been a major 
board reorganisation.  
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The major decision for boards deciding to implement an external review is whether 
they should use a specialist consultant or trusted general adviser.  Some boards prefer 
to utilise a trusted adviser, such as the firm’s legal counsel or auditor, to conduct the 
evaluation.  This allows the board to work with people they already know and whom 
they believe understand the boardroom dynamics.   
In contrast, a specialist consultant has the advantages of often possessing a higher 
level of technical skill and being perceived as having a greater degree of 
independence.  The specialised nature of a board review requires skills often outside 
the customary scope of many general advisers.  Similarly, a consultant engaged 
specifically to carry out the evaluation can be perceived as more independent than a 
reviewer with an existing relationship with the firm (such as a general counsel or 
auditor), if that is an important consideration for the board.  Finally, specialist 
consultants will have a broad range of exposure to different boardroom practices and 
benchmarks, so if comparison and new ideas are key objectives, specialist consultants 
may be the answer. 
Whether choosing between a trusted adviser or specialist consultant, there are some 
important questions the board needs to consider: 
• Does the proposed facilitator have sufficient skills and experience to conduct 
an evaluation? 
• Has the facilitator conducted board evaluations for other boards like ours? 
• Does the facilitator have access to benchmarking information and alternative 
governance ideas that will add value to the process? 
• Will the facilitator be able to form a balanced and objective view of our 
board? 
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• Will the board trust the facilitator sufficiently to ensure a positive outcome? 
What do you do with the results? 
The review’s objectives should be the determining factor when deciding to whom the 
results will be released. Most often the board’s central objective will be to agree a 
series of actions that it can take to improve governance.  Since the effectiveness of an 
organisation’s governance system relies on people within the firm, communicating the 
results to internal stakeholders is critical for boards seeking performance 
improvement.  Given that virtually all governance reviews are conducted with a view 
to improving the governance system, boards are rarely faced with the decision of 
whether to communicate the results internally.  Rather, the decision is who within the 
organisation needs to know the results. 
Since the board as a whole is responsible for its performance, the results of the review 
will be released to the board in all but the most unusual of circumstances.  Where the 
evaluation objectives are focused entirely on the board, board members will simply 
discuss the results among themselves.  This occurs, for example, when the objective is 
to conduct a general review of the board’s performance, with a view to improving 
board process or gaining a shared understanding among board members as to roles or 
other items of interest.  Normally, the board and the corporate/company secretary will 
review the findings around the boardroom table, and there will be no need to 
communicate the results to anyone else.   
Where the results of the evaluation concern individual director performance, the 
generally accepted approach is for the chairperson and/or facilitator to discuss them 
individually, with each director.  This approach has three advantages.  First, it reflects 
good performance management principles and ethics by respecting the confidentiality 
of the process and the individual’s integrity.  Second, it ensures that difficult topics, 
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often avoided in the boardroom setting, have a venue for discussion.  Third, it does 
not rely on director self-diagnosis; there is a measure of objectivity and 
accountability, particularly where the director and chairperson/facilitator outline a 
development plan to which the director can be held accountable. 
The CEO has a significant influence on the governance system and is nearly always 
involved in the review of results.  The key decision here is whether informing the 
CEO would adversely affect board dynamics and solidarity.  Where board dynamics 
or individual relationships are major governance concerns, the principle of board 
solidarity may require it to hold an in camera session.   
In circumstances where the objective of the board evaluation is to assess the quality of 
board-management relationships, or where there are process issues concerning 
management input into board meetings and papers, results of the evaluation will 
generally be shared with the senior management team.  Some organisations choose to 
communicate a summary of the board evaluation results more widely in the 
organisation.  This can be particularly helpful where boards are seeking to inculcate a 
culture of performance management and accountability within the company.  
In certain circumstances, the board will have an objective of building its reputation for 
transparency and/or developing relationships with key external stakeholders.  In such 
circumstances, the board should consider communicating some or all of the results of 
its review to those stakeholders.  Communicating the results of the evaluation 
demonstrates that the board takes governance seriously and is committed to improving 
its performance.   
Additionally, depending upon who participated in the evaluation, the board may also 
wish to communicate results to key customers, suppliers or other groups important for 
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its continued success (e.g., unions, environmental groups).  Sharing information with 
these major groups is likely to persuade them that the board is committed to 
improving stakeholder relationships.  It also provides feedback to those who have 
been asked for their views on the board’s performance and can serve to strengthen 
their relationships with the board.   
The performance evaluation cycle 
Aside from the seven key questions in an evaluation, boards need to consider how 
often they should evaluate their performance.  Some boards decide to undertake 
reviews on an “as needs” basis.  This approach may be beneficial to boards that have a 
clearly articulated and understood policy on the triggers that will prompt a review.  
The difficulty with the “as needs” review is that, unless there are clear guidelines 
linking them to specific situations such as a change in board composition, 
performance evaluation is liable to be overlooked.   
When choosing to institute a regular review process, boards can institute frequent or 
longer-term cycles.  Some boards choose to hold a regular performance evaluation 
every two or three years.  These tend to be extensive appraisal processes, combining 
interviews and surveys and often involving an external facilitator.  The chief 
disadvantage of two or three-yearly reviews is that most businesses operate in a very 
dynamic environment and many changes will occur during this time frame.  
The annual review is the most commonly recommended form of board evaluation.   
This is consistent with the annual planning cycle adopted by most boards.  Some 
boards find it useful to tie board evaluation to the strategy formulation process.  This 
is a useful way of adapting performance expectations to fit the strategic needs of the 
organisation.  For those organisations operating in more dynamic business 
environments, however, annual reviews may not be frequent enough.  In high 
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technology industries, for example, a review of the board’s performance every six 
months may be more appropriate.  
Although the annual review is the most common form of evaluation, this does not 
necessarily make it the most effective.  There is always a danger that the predictable 
annual event will become stale and no longer add value.  If evaluation becomes too 
routine an activity, boards are in danger of becoming complacent.  In these 
circumstances, it is important to experiment with different evaluation styles and 
techniques to keep the process interesting and ensure that it continues to lead to 
performance improvements.  Notwithstanding the concern over the process becoming 
stale through repetition, a set of questions that provide specific, measurable data 
against which the board can benchmark its performance over time can further 
contribute to the board’s continuing improvement. 
Some commentators believe that performance evaluation should be an ongoing 
process, not just an annual event (e.g., Carver, 1997a).  High performing boards tend 
to devise other mechanisms apart from an annual review to ensure ongoing 
performance improvement.  One option is to review the effectiveness of each board 
meeting.  This can be scheduled as a regular agenda item, with directors taking turns 
to lead the discussion.  The technique involves the appointment of one board member 
to act as the “meeting evaluator”.  This person observes the participants, assesses the 
content and importance of items on the agenda and the quality of board papers.  The 
evaluator then gives his or her opinion in a five-minute review at the end of the 
meeting.  The other board members are then asked for their comments on the 
effectiveness of the meeting and to offer suggestions for improving performance.  The 
whole process is intended to last no more than 10 or 15 minutes.  This is a simple 
technique for keeping performance issues “front of mind” for the board.  It is an easy 
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way to gain quick feedback and to encourage discussion and interaction between 
board members, and it requires little time or effort to put in place. 
Conclusion 
Performance evaluation is becoming increasingly important for boards and directors.  
Pressure for improved evaluation is coming from two main sources.  First, some 
commentators are calling for mandatory performance appraisals to promote corporate 
transparency and accountability.  Second, there are clear performance benefits to 
companies when their leaders are willing to engage in an open and honest appraisal of 
their own performance. 
While compliance pressures for improved evaluations should be a consideration for 
all boards, we have concentrated on emphasising the performance benefits that are 
possible with rigorous board and individual director evaluation processes.  A key way 
for a board to demonstrate its commitment to continuing improvement is through 
critical evaluation. Therefore, a regular board evaluation process is an important 
process that can really add value.  It benefits individuals, boards and the companies 
for which they work. 
Boards also need to recognise that the evaluation process is an effective team-
building, ethics shaping activity.  Our observation is that boards often neglect the 
process of engagement when undertaking evaluations; unfortunately, boards that fail 
to engage their members are missing a major opportunity for developing a shared set 
of board norms and inculcating a positive board and organisation culture.  In short, the 
process is as important as the content.  In conclusion, implementing a robust and 
successful board and director evaluation is one important way to ensure that a board 
can avert governance failure and consequent organisational failure. 
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Table 1:  Potential benefits of board evaluation 
Benefits To organisation To board To individual directors 
Leadership ▪ Sets the performance 
tone and culture of the 
organisation 
▪ Role model for CEO 
and senior 
management team 
▪ An effective 
chairperson utilising a 
board evaluation 
demonstrates 
leadership to the rest 
of the board 
▪ Demonstrates long-
term focus of the 
board 
▪ Leadership behaviours 
agreed and 
encouraged 
▪ Demonstrates 
commitment to 
improvement at 
individual level 
Role clarity ▪ Enables clear 
distinction between 
the roles of the CEO, 
management and the 
board 
▪ Enables appropriate 
delegation principles 
▪ Clarifies director and 
committee roles 
▪ Sets a board norm for 
roles 
▪ Clarifies duties of 
individual directors  
▪ Clarifies protection of 
directors 
▪ Clarifies expectations 
Teamwork ▪ Builds board/CEO/ 
management 
relationships 
▪ Builds trust between 
board members 
▪ Encourages active 
participation 
▪ Develops commitment 
and sense of 
ownership 
▪ Encourages individual 
director involvement 
▪ Develops commitment 
and sense of 
ownership 
▪ Clarifies expectations 
Accountability  ▪ Improved stakeholder 
relationships, e.g., 
investors, financial 
markets 
▪ Improved corporate 
governance standards 
▪ Clarifies delegations 
▪ Focuses board 
attention on duties to 
stakeholders 
▪ Ensures board is 
appropriately 
monitoring 
organisation 
▪ Ensures directors 
understand their legal 
duties and 
responsibilities 
▪ Sets performance 
expectations for 
individual board 
members 
Decision making  ▪ Clarifying strategic 
focus and corporate 
goals 
▪ Improves 
organisational 
decision making 
▪ Clarifying strategic 
focus  
▪ Aids in the 
identification of skills 
gaps on the board 
▪ Improves the board’s 
decision-making ability 
▪ Identifies areas where 
director skills need 
development 
▪ Identifies areas where 
the director’s skills can 
be better utilised 
Communication ▪ Improves stakeholder 
relationships 
▪ Improves board-
management 
relationships 
▪ Improved board-CEO 
relationships 
▪ Improves board-
management 
relationships 
▪ Builds trust between 
board members 
▪ Builds personal 
relationships between 
individual directors 
Board operations ▪ Ensures an 
appropriate top-level 
policy framework 
exists to guide the 
organisation 
▪ More efficient 
meetings 
▪ Better time 
management 
▪ Saves directors’ time 
▪ Increases 
effectiveness of 
individual contributors 
Source: Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005 
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Table 2:  Skills of the board: topics and sample questions 
Topic Sample questionnaire items 
Defining governance roles 
1. Is the role of a board member clearly defined? Role of the board 
2. Is the role of a board member well understood? 
3. Does the spread of talent within the board reflect the company’s needs? 
4. Do all board members bring valuable skills and experience to the company? Board structure 
5. Is the board large enough to carry out the work required of it? 
Improving board processes 
6. Do the board papers contain the correct amount and type of information? 
7. Are board members diligent in preparing for meetings? Board meetings 
8. Are matters relating to the company discussed in a structured manner? 
Key board functions 
9. Does the board know and understand the company’s mission, vision and 
strategy? 
10. Does the board know and keep abreast of trends and issues affecting the 
market in which the company competes? 
Strategy 
11. Does the board understand the business it is governing? 
Service/advice/ 
contacts 
12. Do board members actively engage in networking for the benefit of the 
company? 
Monitoring 13. Do board members have sufficient financial skills to ensure the board can discharge its governance responsibilities? 
Compliance 14. Does the company have relevant internal reporting and compliance systems? 
15. Are board members aware of their risk assessment duties as directors? Risk 
management 16. Is there a clear understanding of the company’s business risk? 
Continuing improvement 
Director 
development 
17. Does the board encourage directors to pursue opportunities for personal 
development? 
18. Does the board have a succession plan in place for the chairperson? 
19. Does the board have a director succession plan in place? Director selection and 
induction 20. Are there clear and well understood policies and procedures in place for 
director selection and induction? 
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Table 3:  Who has the knowledge? 
Category Information sources Knowledge benefits Potential drawbacks 
Board 
members 
▪ Should have key knowledge on 
skills, processes, relationships, 
level of shared understanding 
▪ Suffer from biases (such as 
groupthink) 
▪ Little understanding of external 
perceptions of the board 
▪ Do not provide a “set of fresh 
eyes” with which to examine 
governance processes 
CEO 
▪ Should have a different perspective 
on all elements of board activity 
▪ Key insight into the advice role of 
board 
▪ Key insight into succession issues 
▪ Potentially suffers from biases 
▪ Potentially impression manages 
for the board, particularly on 
issues of management activities 
▪ May have a limited or biased 
understanding of external 
perceptions 
Senior 
managers 
▪ Generally good insights into 
communication between the board 
and management 
▪ May not have enough exposure 
to the board 
▪ May be tainted by internal 
company politics 
Internal 
sources 
Other 
employees 
▪ Should have insight into the culture 
of the organisation 
▪ The further removed from the 
board, the less likely employees 
can comment on actual 
performance 
▪ Limited exposure to the board 
Owners/ 
members ▪ Understand ownership aims 
▪ Will depend on the ownership 
structure (may be disparate) 
Customers 
▪ Can have unique insights, 
particularly if the company has very 
few customers 
▪ Most likely will have little insight 
into how the board operates 
▪ Potential to “game” the system  
Government 
▪ Can have insightful views, 
particularly in certain areas of 
compliance, if these are critical 
▪ Often limited interaction with most 
companies 
Suppliers 
▪ Can have unique insights, 
particularly if the company has very 
few suppliers 
▪ Most likely will have little insight 
into how the board operates 
External 
experts 
▪ Useful benchmarking or best 
practice insights 
▪ May not understand company’s 
context 
External 
sources 
Other 
stakeholders 
▪ Will depend on nature of the 
company 
▪ Will depend on nature of the 
company 
 
Source: Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005 
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Table 4:  Chairperson, non-executive director and committee evaluations 
Chairperson  Non-executive director  Committee 
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages
• Part of 
leadership role 
– clear 
acceptance by 
board 
members 
• Clear 
accountability 
• Can align 
process with 
overall board 
agenda 
• Possible bias 
• Concentration 
of power, 
particularly if 
the CEO is 
chairperson 
• Heavy 
workload 
• Clear 
accountability 
• More 
independent 
view 
• More time to 
devote to task 
• Other 
leadership 
experiences/ 
skills 
• Possible bias 
• Possible effect 
on board 
dynamics 
• Knowledge of 
the company 
will be less 
than that of the 
chairperson 
• Relieves 
chairperson/ 
non-executive 
director of 
workload 
• Less reliant on 
the viewpoint 
of one person 
• Less subject to 
individual bias 
• Longer 
process 
• Demands 
greater 
resources 
(time, money 
etc.) 
 
Source: Kiel, Nicholson and Barclay, 2005 
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Figure 1:  Framework for a board evaluation 
What are our objectives?hat are our objectives?
Who will be evaluated?ho will be evaluated?
What will be evaluated?hat will be evaluated?
Who will be asked?ho will be asked?
What techniques will be used?hat techniques will be used?
Who will do the evaluation?ho will do the evaluation?
What will you do with the results?hat will you do with the results?  
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Figure 2:  Who will be evaluated? 
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Figure 3:  The Corporate Governance Charter model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kiel & Nicholson, 2003 
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Figure 4:  Who will be asked? 
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Figure 5:  Evaluation techniques 
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Figure 6:  Who conducts the board evaluation? 
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